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THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES: A GUIDE TO THE RENAISSANCE OF U.S. NAVAL STRATEGIC THINKING IN THE 1980s

by

PETER M. SWARTZ

24 FEBRUARY 1988

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An annotated bibliography of open-source literature pertaining to the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy. This report integrates and expands upon materials published previously by the U.S. Naval Institute in January 1986, February 1987, and April 1987. It is compiled to assist military strategic planners, ananlysts, and academics in their professional/educational duties. This version is issued to allow a wider distribution than that done by OPNAV and to serve as the initial draft of an annual update to be performed by the Naval Postgraduate School.

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INTRODUCTION

This is a bibliography with a point of view. It takes as a departure point the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, as enunciated by the civilian and military leaders of the U.S Government, especially the Department of the Navy. It includes criticisms of and commentaries on that strategy, as well as items relating the Maritime Strategy to overall national and allied milita strategy, and to historical precedents. In addition, it covers both how the Strategy was developed and who developed it, and the importa role of wargaming.

The Maritime Strategy has generated enormous debate. All sides and aspects of the debate are presented here. The focus, however, i on that Strategy. Absent are discussions of naval affairs which do have as their points of departure--explicitly or implicitly--the contemporary Maritime Strategy debate.

In order to trace the ebb and flow of ideas and events over tir items are listed chronologically, by occurence or publication date, rather than merely alphabetically. Authoritative official statement of the Maritime Strategy are indicated by an asterisk (*). Explicit direct commentaries on the Maritime Strategy are indicated by a doul asterisk (**). The other items listed deal implicitly with various issues or aspects of the Maritime Strategy or with its immediate antecedents.

Publications on Sister Service and Allied contributions to the Maritime Strategy are listed separately, to aid the reader/research (Admittedly, this and other artifical typological devices run agains central theme of the Maritime Strategy: its global, "seamless web" character). Also, only cursory attention is paid to pre-1981 Navy strategic thinking on global war, a structural shortcoming that can legitimately be cited as evidence that such thinking was lacking.

I. MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES: 1979-1985

American military strategy and its maritime component have been debated since the foundation of the republic. Following World War II, maritime strategy concerns centered around peacetime presence, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and the Navy's role in nuclear strike warfare against the Soviet Union. During the late 1950s and 1960s the focus shifted to limited war and deterrence through nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) operations. In the early 1970s, the debate centered on then Chief of Naval Operations Elmo R. Zumwalt's formulation of the "Four Missions of the Navy"--strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and peacetime presence. (A major body of literature began to be created then on presence). In the mid-1970s, sea control seemed to dominate discussions.

In 1978, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward became Chief of Naval Operations. His views on strategy had been heavily influenced by his experience as Seventh Fleet Commander and Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief in the post-Vietnam environment. Admiral Hayward's focus was on flexible offensive forward power projection, conducted globally and in conjunction with allies and sister services, especially against the Soviet Union and its attacking forces. Much of this was a return to concepts familiar to U.S. naval officers of the first post-World War II decade. That era's focus on nuclear strikes, however, now broadened to encompass a much wider range of options, primarily conventional.

Admiral Hayward outlined his views publicly in his initial 1979 testimony before Congress, and subsequently in the pages of the Proceedings. The naval strategic renaissance and the resultant debate he and others sparked continues to this day, fueled by the statements and policies of the Reagan Administration, especially its first Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., who served from February 1981 to April 1987.

The initial public Maritime Strategy discussion of the early 1980s had largely taken the form of a debate on the pages of American public and foreign affairs and national security periodicals. This debate had focused on two themes: the general forward strategic principles (and certain highly publicized Norwegian Sea examples) enunciated repeatedly by Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. and a perceived "Maritime Strategy versus Coalition Warfare" dichotomy incessantly alleged by former Under Secretary of Defense Robert Komer and others.

At the same time, however, the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps -- in conjunction with officers of their sister services and allies -- had been tasked to develop for internal use a detailed description of the Maritime Strategy component of U. S. national military strategy. This Maritime Strategy rigorously integrated into one clear, consistent document a number of long held views of Navy and Marine Corps senior officers, certain newly refined concepts developed in the fleet and at the Naval War College, agreed national intelligence estimates, the strategic principles articulated by Secretary Lehman and other Reagan Administration officials, and a thoughtful discussion of the variety and range of uncertainties inherent in the strategy.

Concepts developed by the Navy's warfare communities and fleets as well as by Army, Air Force, joint, and allied commanders, were examined and incorporated as appropriate. Where inconsistencies appeared, hard choices were made. Uncertainties and limitations were identified. Properly, the job was spearheaded by the Strategic Concepts Group on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-603

The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy was codified initially in 1982 to focus Navy program development efforts more tightly. Its basic premises already had been underlying Navy planning, gaming, and exercises. Subsequently, congressional testimony in 198 released an initial edition of the Maritime Strategy to the public. classified revision to the strategy statement was approved by the Navy's Program Review Committee (chaired by then Vice Admiral Carlis Trost) in October 1983 and signed and distributed Navy-wide by Admir James D. Watkins, then Chief of Naval Operations, in 1984.

Various unclassified elements of the strategy began to find the way into naval affairs journals, especially the Proceedings. Writing on naval strategy that did not take the Maritime Strategy as a start point began to fade. By 1985, enough authoritative congressional testimony, speeches, op-ed pieces, journal articles, and letters-to-the-editor -- penned by senior naval officers and well-placed civilian commentators -- had appeared for the essential elements of the Maritime Strategy to be accessible to the public. Public commentary gradually shifted from exegeses on the press conferences, speeches, and articles of Secretary Lehman and Ambassador Komer to discussions on aspects of the actual Maritime Strategy developed largely by military officers from national and alliance guidance and approved by civilian leadership.

Promulgation of the Maritime Strategy fostered increasing public and government discourse. Within the Navy, the interplay among the Maritime Strategy, force-level planning, fleet plans and operations and professional education and training became a governing dynamic. the open literature, the number of writings on the strategy rose from handful of newspaper and journal articles in 1981 to an avalanche of government documents, books, and articles in 1986, including over 145,000 copies distributed of the Proceedings' watershed "The Maritime Strategy" January 1986 supplement alone. This quantitative leap was accompanied by qualitative changes in both the background of the commentators and the sophistication of their arguments.

Contrary to much uninformed external criticism of the early 19 the Maritime Strategy was presented by the Navy as only one--albeit vital--component of the national military strategy. It was not presented as a recommended dominant theme of that national strategy. Also contrary to earlier uninformed criticism, the strategy embodied the views of unified and fleet commanders as well as Washington military and civilian planners and Newport thinkers. The Navy Department and the fleet were now speaking with one sophisticated voice to--and increasingly for--the nation and its allies.

Hayward, ADM Thomas B., "The Future of U.S. Sea Power," Proceedings/Naval Review, May 1979, pp. 66-71; Also Zumwalt, ADM Elmo R., Jr., "Total Force," pp. 103-106; and "Comment and Discussion:" July 1979, pp. 23-24; August 1979, pp. 87-89; September 1979, pp. 89-91; October 1979, p. 21; December 1979, p. 88; January 1980, pp. 82-86. (Public debate on the new era of U.S. Navy strategy begins. Hayward, Zumwalt, Bill Lind, Norman Friedman, et al. See also Hayward "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1979-1982.)

Moorer, ADM Thomas H. USN (Ret.) and Cottrell, Alvin J., "Sea Power and NATO Strategy", in Myers, Kenneth A., NATO: The Next Thirty Years, Boulder CO: Westview, 1980, pp 223-236. (Detailed arguments on the necessarily global nature of any major future war with the Soviets and the need for forward carrier operations off the Kola, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk, by the 1970-1974 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 1967-1970 Chief of Naval Operations. Arguments against a "swing" strategy from the Pacific are also echoed in "For Want of a Nail: the Logistics of the Alliance" by ADM Isaac Kidd USN (Ret.), former U.S. Navy and NATO commander in both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, in the same volume, pp 189-205).

Turner, ADM Stansfield, USN (Ret.) "Thinking About the Future of the Navy," Proceedings, August 1980, pp. 66-69. Also "Comment and Discussion": October 1980, p. 101; November 1980, pp. 124-127; January 1981, p. 77. (ADM Turner questions role of power projection in general war strategy.)

U.S .Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, Nomination of John F. Lehman, Jr., to be Secretary of the Navy, January 28, 1981, Washington: USGPO, 1981. ("I think the major need of the Navy today is the establishment by the President and the Congress of a clearly articulated naval strategy, first and foremost").

Prina, L. Edgar, "Budget Increases Reflect 'A Major Change in Naval Strategy'", Sea Power, April 1981, pp 13-22. (Best coverage of Secretary Lehman's press conference of 3 March 1981, when he unveiled his "major change". See also page 1 of the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, and Baltimore Sun, March 4, 1981, and George, James L. "US Carriers--Bold New Strategy", Navy International, June 1981, pp 330-335. Compare with Hayward and Moorer/Cottrell pieces above).

Hart, Senator Gary, "Can Congress Come to Order?", in Franck, Thomas, (ed.), The Tethered Presidency, New York: New York University Press, 1981, pp 242-3. (A call for a national maritime -only strategy and "obvious and indisputable naval superiority". The U.S. Navy certainly shares the second goal, but not the first)

Betts, Richard K., Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics, Washington: Brookings, 1981, pp 537-540. (Sees discussion of carrier penetration of Soviet waters as "peacetime deterrent rhetoric" about risky "missions that could turn into a naval Charge of the Light Brigade").

Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control, Challenges for U.S. National Security: Assessing the Balance: Defense Spending and Conventional Forces: A Preliminary Report, Part II, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1981. (Chapter 3, pp 99-148, assesses the naval balance and identifies key issues. No policy recommendations. Comprehensiv and even-handed. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, purely budget-oriented).

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Rebirth of a U.S. Naval Strategy," Strategic Review, Summer 1981, pp. 9-15. (For more than two years, the basic Navy public statement on Maritime Strategy. Se also Lehman "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1981-1987, especially regarding linkages among operations, strategy, and programs.)

Zumwalt, ADM Elmo R., Jr., USN (Ret.) "Naval Battles We Could Lose", International Security Review, Summer 1981 pp 139-155. (the 1970-1974 U.S. Navy CNO. Argues for more stress on the U.S. Navy as "geopolitical cavalry" for low-to-middle-level conflict, and for a "distributed force" building program as optimum for th full spectrum of naval warfare requirements, including nuclear w at sea).

Stockman, David, The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan Revolution Failed. New York: Harper and Row, 1986, pp 280-281. (Anonymous "experts" ridicule "the theory of 'getting in harm's way'" in mid-1981 to President Reagan's gullible budget directo

Caldwell, Hamlin, "The Empty Silo--Strategic ASW, "Naval War College Review, September-October 1981, pp. 4-14. (Call for anti-SSBN operations in Soviet home water bastions.)

Koburger, CAPT C. W., USCGR, "Pitts' Choice: An Alternative NA Strategy for the USA", Navy International, December 1981, pp 730-731. (Like that of Sen. Hart, one of the very few real examples of a call for a "pure" national maritime strategy, a position often falsely attributed to proponents of the U.S. Nav Maritime Strategy).

Ikle, Fred Charles, "The Reagan Defense Program: A Focus on th Strategic Imperatives", Strategic Review, Spring 1982, pp 11-18 (By the Under Secretary oif Defense for Policy. Especially goo on administration requirements for naval forces to provide opti to fight on a variety of fronts).

Kennedy, COL William V., USAR (Ret.), "Tailor Military Strategy the Economy", Philadelphia Inquirer, 26 May 1982, p 25. (Sees Reagan Administration as building a new maritime strategy on to of an old continental strategy. Considers the Soviet Far East the key Soviet vulnerability for naval forces to exploit).

Record, Jeffrey, and Hanks, RADM Robert J., USN (Ret.). U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads, Washington: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, July 1982. (Two different arguments for a sh to a national maritime strategy, including one by a prominent Navy strategist of the mid-1970s.)

Komer, Robert, "Maritime Strategy vs Coalition Defense," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1982, pp. 1, 124-1, 144. Also Turner, ADM Stansfield, and Thibault, CAPT George, "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy," Fall 1982, pp. 125-135; "Comments and Correspondence: Maritime Strategies," Winter 1982/3, pp. 453-457. (The debate jumps to a wider arena: Komer vs Turner vs Lehman. Ambassador Komer had been a leading Carter Administration Defense Department official from 1977 to 1981.)

Vlahos, Michael, "U.S. Naval Strategy: Geopolitical Needs and the Soviet Maritime Challenge", in Taylor, William J., Jr., et al. (eds.), Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 1980s, Lexington MA: D.C. Heath, 1984, pp 427-432. (1982 views of a former Naval War College faculty member. Especially good on late 1970s internal U.S. Navy strategy debates, and as critique of tying U.S. naval strategy too closely to the Soviet naval threat. Cf approach taken by McGruther, cited in Section XI below. This volume also contains some of Ambassador Komer's early--and retrospectively most lucid--arguments, at pp 196-199).

Vlahos, Michael, "Maritime Strategy versus Continental Commitment," Orbis, Fall 1982, pp. 583-589. (Argues that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive.)

Posen, Barry A., "Inadvertent Nuclear War?: Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank," International Security, Fall 1982, pp. 28-54. (Claims forward U.S. Navy operations in the Norwegian Sea and elsewhere are a bad thing.)

Zakheim, Dov, "The Unforeseen Contingency: Reflections on Strategy," Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1982, pp. 158-166. (Reagan administration maritime strategy in overall military context, by a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.

Lehman, John, "Support for Defense is Still Strong", Washington Post, December 16, 1982, p 23. ("The Navy is working to do its part in a team effort of forward-based air, land, and naval power. Navy strategy is part and parcel of the national strategy of deterrence, not a substitute for it").

Cohen, Eliot A., "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1982/3, pp 325-343. (A Naval War College faculty member argues for strengthening the U.S. Navy, creation of a "Fifth Fleet", global U.S. military focus and increased European military responsibilities in NATO. Seeks to bridge the "Atlanticist vs navalist" debate).

Huntington, Samuel P., "The Defense Policy, 1981-1982," in Greenstein, Fred I. (Ed.), The Reagan Presidency, An Early Assessment, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, pp. 82-116. (Initial Reagan overall defense policies and strategy, the contest of the Maritime Strategy.)

Glenn, Senator John, Carter, Barry E., Komer, Robert W., Rethinking Defense and Conventional Forces, Washington: Center for National Policy, 1983. (Two ex-Army officers, Carter, pp 33-35, and Komer, pp 46-48, attack the Maritime Strategy and the 600-ship Navy).

Posen, Barry, and Van Evera, Stephen, "Reagan Administration Defense Policy: Departure from Containment", in Oye, Kenneth A. Lieber, Robert J. and Rothchild, Donald (eds.), Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s, Boston: Little Brown 1983, pp 67-104. (Critical of all aspects of Reagan defense policy and strategy, including offensive conventional warfightin especially with naval forces. "Overall, a counteroffensive strategy is a bottomless pit, since it generates very demanding missions that cannot be achieved without huge expenses, if they can be achieved at all... a counteroffensive strategy defeats th basic purpose of American conventional forces--the control of escalation." Adovcates a 10-carrier force).

Brown, Harold, Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World, Boulder CO: Westview Press 1983. (By the 1977-1981 Secretary of Defense. Mildly critical forward carrier operations; more strongly critical of the 600-sh Navy build-up. See especially pp 100-101, 121-123, 171-187).

Miller, Steven, "The Northern Seas in Soviet and U.S. Strategy" in Lodgaard, Sverre and Thee, Marek, (eds.), Nuclear Disengagem in Europe, London: Taylor and Francis, 1983, pp 117-137. (Comprehensive analysis, especially of tie-in between U.S. nava strategy and Reagan administration policy).

Staudenmaier, COL William, USA, "One if by Land - Two if by Sea The Continental - Maritime Debate", Army, January 1983, pp 30-3 (Opening salvo of the "Carlisle School". A leading Army War College faculty member contributes to the misperceptions that t central U.S. naval strategy debate is about Maritime Strategy v Continental Strategy, and that it is driven solely by budgetary considerations).

* U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, Fi Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization fo FY84; Part 4, Washington: GPO, 1983, pp. 47-51. (COMO Dudley Carlson publicly unveils a version of the U.S. Navy's "first cu Maritime Strategy, February 1983. Published later that year.)

Tritten, CDR James J., "It's Not Either Or", Wings of Gold, Spr 1983, pp 49-52. (Argues Mahanian concept of U.S. seapower is necessary to support U.S. forward defense continental strategy)

Nunn, Senator Sam, The Need to Reshape Military Strategy, Washington: Georgetown University CSIS, March 18, 1983, p 7. (Advocates choke point defense, vice carrier-based airpower, vs the Soviet homeland).

Caldwell, Hamlin, "Arctic Submarine Warfare", Submarine Review, July 1983, pp 4-13. (Develops further the arguments in his 1981 article).

Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, COL William O., USA, "Strategy for Survival," Foreign Policy, Fall 1983, pp. 22-41. Also Komer and Dunn and Staudenmaier letters, Winter 1983-84, pp. 176-178. (The "Carlisle School" again. Seeks to synthesize all points in the maritime-continental debate.)

Arkin, William M., "Nuclear Weapons at Sea", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1983, pp 6-7. (Sees U.S. Navy theater nuclear weapons under development as destabilizing, despite Soviet theater nuclear naval programs).

** Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting Perspective", Proceedings, October 1983, pp 66-81. (By a former Under Secretary of the Navy and the first Director of the Naval War College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies. See especially pp 70 & 74 on the maritime strategy and the role of the Naval War College. "You hve to discard the term 'naval strategy', and even the slightly more modern variant, 'maritime strategy' and talk instead about the naval contribution to national strategy... Newport is not, of course, the planning center for the Navy. It is, however, one place where naval officers get together and try to produce better ideas").

Epstein, Joshua M., "Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a Recurrent Theme", International Security, Winter 1983/84, pp 19-31, especially pp 23-25. Also reprinted in Art, Raymond and Waltz, Kenneth (eds.), The Use of Force (second edition), 1983, and updated as Chapter 3 of Epstein's Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf, Washington: Brookings, 1987. (Critique of 'Horizontal Escalation', not only as a counter to a Soviet invasion of Iran, but also apparently as a function of maritime forces in a global war with the Soviets. Sees Soviet-Chinese wartime relationship as unaffected by naval considerations, and regards Soviet ground force numbers as virtually limitless. No discussion of possible Soviet air force redeployment, however).

Record, Jeffrey, "Jousting with Unreality: Reagan's Military Strategy," International Security, Winter 1983/84, pp. 3-18. Also "Correspondence," Summer 1984, pp. 217-221. (Echoes Komer's and Turner's stated positions.)

Kaufmann, William W., The 1985 Defense Budget, Washington: Brookings, 1984, especially pp 29-34. (A snide critique of U.S. Navy strategy and force level requests. Naval power projection forces seen as only needed in Third World areas during a global war with the Soviets. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-oriented document). See also Kaufmann chapters in earlier 1982 and 1983 Brookings annuals edited by Joseph Pechman, Setting National Priorities: 1983 and 1984, and his 1981 Defense in the 1980s.

Record, Jeffrey, Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Mea to Ends, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984. (An argument fo a national maritime strategy, but without the offensive forward operations characteristic of the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy. S especially pp 83-86).

Ullman, CDR Harlan, USN (Ret.), Crisis or Opportunity? U.S. Maritime Industries and National Security, Washington: Georgeto CSIS, 1984. (Pp 4-7 give a good quick summary of the basic opposing viewpoints on U.S. naval strategy, eschewing the extraneous elements usually dragged in by unknowledgeable would analysts).

Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "From SLOC Protection to a National Maritime Strategy: The U.S. Navy under Carter and Reagan, 1977-1984", in Hagan, Kenneth J., (ed.), In Peace and War, (Sec Edition), Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1984. (Mostly on operations and shipbuilding. Sees Secretary Lehman's contribut as a reorientation of national strategy rather than simply an enhancement of its maritime elements).

Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, COL William O., USA, Strategi Implications of the Continental-Maritime Debate (Washington Pap #107), Washington: CSIS, 1984. (Expands arguments made in the Foreign Policy article.)

Tritten, CDR James J., "Strategic ASW: A Good Idea?", Proceedings, January 1984, pp 90, 92. (Argues for procuring anti-SSBN systems without declaring an anti-SSBN policy. See a his "Strategic ASW", Submarine Review, January 1984, pp 52-55, "The Concept of Strategic ASW", Navy International, June 1984, 348-350).

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Nine Principles for the Future of Americ Maritime Power," Proceedings, February 1984, pp. 47-51. (Refinement of Secretary Lehman's thought after three years in office.)

Zakheim, Dov s., "The Role of Amphibious Operations in Nationa Military Strategy", Marine Corps Gazette, March 1984, pp. 35-3 (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense explains Marine missions an programs in context of overall administration strategy.)

* Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, Secon Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization f FY85; Part 8, Washington: GPO, 1985, pp. 3851-3900. (SECNAV CNO jointly describe Maritime Strategy as component of nationa military strategy, March 1984. Further exposure of the Strate presented by COMO Carlson a year earlier.)

Rivkin, D.B., "No Bastions for the Bear," Proceedings, April 1 pp. 36-43. Also "Comment and Discussion:" June 1984, pp. 14-1 July 1984, pp. 14-20; August 1974, p. 101; September 1984, p. October 1984, pp. 97-100; January 1985, p. 129, (The anti-SSBN mission debate.)

Turner, ADM Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "A Strategy for the 90s." New York Times Magazine, 6 May 1984, pp. 30-40, etc. (Argues for focus on USN Third World intervention role, amphibious warfare, and more/smaller ships.)

Hamm, Manfred, "Ten Steps to Counter Moscow's Threat to Northern Europe", Backgrounder (The Heritage Foundation), No. 1356, May 30, 1984. (Calls for rather modest U.S. and allied maritime counters to a greatly increased Soviet threat).

Perry, Robert, Lorell, Mark A., and Lewis, Kevin, Second-Area Operations: A Strategy Option (Publication R-2992-USDP), Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation, May 1984. (Pros, cons, risks and uncertainties associated with multi-theater war and "horizontal escalation". Historical and analytical survey).

Bond, Larry, and Ries, Tomas, "Controversy: A New Strategy for the North-East Atlantic?" International Defense Review, 12/1984, pp. 1803-4. (USN and NATO naval strategy.)

* Watkins, ADM James D., "Current Strategy of U.S. Navy," Los Angeles Times, 21 June 1984, p. 22 (USN rebuttal to Komer, Robert, "Carrier Heavy Navy is Waste-Heavy," Los Angeles Times, 16 May 1984, especially to alleged maritime vs. continental and Navy vs. Europe dichotomies. See also Watkins "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1983-1986).

Komer, Robert, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense, Cambridge, MA: Abt Books, 1984. Also review by Dr. Dov Zakheim, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 1984-85, pp. 721-722. (Ambassador Komer's last salvo before November 1984 elections, with administration retort.)

** Brooks, CAPT Linton F., "Escalation and Naval Strategy," Proceedings, August 1984, pp. 33-37. Also "Comment and Discussion:" October 1984, pp. 28-29; November 1984, pp. 18, 24; December 1984, p. 174. (On Maritime Strategy and nuclear weapons by an important and articulate contributor to development of the Strategy. Focus of public debate begins to shift to the Strategy as it actually is, rather than the Strategy as it is alleged to be.)

* "Navy Maritime Strategy Moving on Offensive," Navy Times, August 20, 1984, pp. 25-26. (COMO William Fogarty outlines Maritime Strategy.)

Stewart, MAJ Richard A., USMC, "Ships That Can Deliver," Proceedings, November 1984, pp. 37-43. (Amphibious versus prepositioning issues.)

** George, James L. (ed.), The U.S. Navy: The View From the Mid-1980s, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. (Papers delivered at a Center for Naval Analyses conference, Fall 1984. See chapters by Dov Zakheim on "Land Based Aviation and Maritime Warfare," Robert Wood and John T. Hanley, Jr., on "The Maritime role in the North Atlantic," and "Commentaries," by retired Admirals Robert Long and Harry Train. Admiral Long's Pacific Command "Concept of Operations" and his Pacific Command Compaign Plan were important building blocks for the Maritime Strategy.)

Jampoler, CAPT Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces?...to Support the Land Battle," Naval War College Review, November-December 1984, pp. 4-12. Also "In My View:" March-Apri 1985, pp. 96-97; July-August 1985 p. 83. (Mainstream U.S. Navy thinking.)

Nagler, VADM Gordon, USN (Ret.), (ed.) Naval Tactical Command an Control, Washington: AFCEA International Press, 1985. (See the articles in Chapter III: "Tactical Space Assets" and Chapter IV: "EW: A Force Multiplier" on how the U.S. Navy uses space and electronic warfare systems to resolve a variety of operational problems inherent in implementing the Maritime Strategy).

Kaufmann, William W., The 1986 Defense Budget, Washington: Brookings, 1985, especially pp. 32-35. (Another sarcastic Kaufmann budget-oriented critique, including an unduly sanguine view of allied naval capabilities).

Jenkins, Ronald Wayne, "Coalition Defense versus Maritime Strategy: A Critical Examination Illustrating a New Approach to Geopolitical Analysis", unpublished PhD dissertation, Pennsylva State University, 1985. (A political geographer's take. Buys into categorization of "Schools" popularized by Komer, Dunn and Staudenmaier. Recognizes irrelevance of much of the pre-1984 literature to "real-world" USN planning and programming problem Includes a study of the views of Naval War College officers on geography and Maritime Strategy).

Thomas, CDR Raymond E., "Maritime Theater Nuclear Warfare: Matching Strategy and Capability", in Essays on Strategy, Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985, pp. 39-51, especially p. 50. (Criticizes U.S. naval strategy for not addressing theater nuclear warfare adequately; disagrees with forward carrier operations in high threat areas).

Collins, COL John M., USA (Ret.), U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985. (Compares strategy and policy as well as force levels. See especially Chapter 11. Also Chapters 9, 12, and 16.)

Zimm, LCDR Alan D., "The First Salvo." Proceedings, February 19 pp. 55-60. Also "Comment and Discussion:" April 1985, p. 16; J 1985, p. 132; July 1985, p. 106. (See especially for timing of forward carrier battle group moves and for Soviet strategy issu

Klare, Michael T., "Securing the Fire Break," World Policy Journal, Spring 1985, pp. 229-247. (Sees forward offensive operations of ships with both nuclear and conventional capabilities as eroding the firebreak between nuclear and non-nuclear combat and raising the likelihood of nuclear war).

Breemer, Jan S., "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence Inference, and Alternative Scenarios," RUSI Journal, March 1985, pp. 18-26. (Includes useful review of literature.)

Ackley, R. T., "No Bastions for the Bear: Round 2." Proceedings, April 1985, pp. 42-47. Also "Comment and Discussion." May 1985, pp. 14-17, July 1985, p. 112. (More on the anti-SSBN mission.)

* Watkins, ADM James D., "Maritime Strategy: Global and Forward," Baltimore Sun, 16 April 1985, p. 15. (USN rejoinder to a variety of critics, especially Record, Jeffrey, "Sanctuary Warfare," Baltimore Sun, 26 March 1985, p. 7.)

** Ullman, Harlan K., and Etzold, Thomas H., Future Imperative: National Security and the U.S. Navy in the Late 1980s. Washington: CSIS, 1985. (See especially Ullman's critique of Maritime Strategy, pp. 20-21, & 67. Contrast with Ullman riposte to Turner, Proceedings, January 198, p. 77.)

Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, COL William O., USA, "The Retaliatory Offensive and Operational Realities in NATO," Survival, May-June 1985, pp. 108-118. (Shows Maritime Strategy similarities to Samuel Huntington proposals to adopt retaliatory offensive strategy on the ground and in the air in Europe. Argues against both.)

Arkin, William M. and Chappell, David, "Forward Offensive Strategy: Raising the Stakes in the Pacific", World Policy Journal, Summer 1985, pp. 481-500. (Forward operations in the Northeast Pacific seen as "provocative and destabilizing". Similar in tone and political coloration to Barry Posen 1982 critique of Norwegian Sea operations).

"The Defense Budget: A Conservative Debate", Policy Review, Summer 1985, pp. 12-27, especially pp. 20-21 (Prominent conservatives line up, pro or con, on the 600-ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy, as they understand it.)

* U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,
** Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials subcommittee, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session. Hearings: The 600-Ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy, Washington: USGPO, 1986. (June and September 1985 graphics-laden testimony by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and several critics and commentators, notably retired Admirals Turner and Carroll. With the Proceedings January 1986 Supplement and related "Comment and Discussion" letters, the most comprehensive public statement and discussion of the Navy's official views on the Maritime Strategy, although lacking in the in-depth discussion of uncertainties which charactized internal Navy Maritime Strategy documents).

Martin, Laurence, NATO and the Defense of the West, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985, especially pp. 30-35 ("Flanks") 51-56 ("Warning, Mobilization and Reinforcement"), and 57-67 ("Th Maritime Battle"). (Features graphics rivaling those in the official U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy testimony in their explanatory power and -- often -- their complexity).

Holloway, ADM James L. III, USN (Ret.), "The U.S. Navy--A Functional Appraisal," Oceanus, Summer 1985, pp. 3-11. (Reformulation of pre-Maritime Strategy USN positions by ADM Hayward's predecessor as CNO. Similar to the Navy's 1978 Strategic Concept of the U.S. Navy (NWP-1). Focus on sea control and on Soviet Navy as anti-SLOC force.)

** Friedman, Norman, "U.S. Maritime Strategy," International Defense Review. 7/1985, pp. 1071-1075. (A prominent civilian naval affairs commentator analyzes rationale for USN Maritime Strategy

* Foley, ADM Sylvester R., Jr., "Strategic Factors in the Pacific, Proceedings, August 1985, pp. 34-38. (Retiring PACFLT Commander-in-Chief discusses his task in context of overall Maritime Strategy. Shows one component commander's view of the strategy.)

Turner, ADM Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "U.S. Naval Policy," Naval Forces, No III/1985, pp. 15-25. (Update of Turner's thought, emphasizing amphibious interventions and North Atlantic SLOC protection.)

** O'Donnell, MAJ Hugh K., USMC, "Northern Flank Maritime Offensive Proceedings, September 1985, pp. 42-57. (USN/USMC global Mariti Strategy as applied to one region; comprehensive commentary on t Maritime Strategy debate.) (Also "Comment and Discussion", October 1985, pp. 16, 20; December 1985, pp. 20-23. See especially January 1986, p. 19 letter discussing complementary Norwegian Navy operations; and February 1986, pp. 19-25 letter b Dr. Norman Friedman elaborating on and endorsing the Maritime Strategy, and placing it in historical context).

* "NATO Forces Flex Muscles in Norwegian Sea," Virginian-Pilot, 9 September 1985, pp. 1+. (Another fleet view of the strategy. VADM Henry C. Mustin, U.S. Second Fleet and NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander, on exercising and implementing Maritime Strategy in his theater.) See also "Protection of Convoy Route Key Objective for Ocean Safari 85," Jane's Defense Weekly, 5 October 1985, pp. 749-753.

** U.S. Navy, First Annual Long Range Planners' Conference: 17-18 September 1985, Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-00K), 1986. (On relationships among the Maritim Strategy and U.S. Navy long-range planning, program development and research).

Gordon, Michael R., "Lehman's Navy Riding High, But Critics Question Its Strategy and Rapid Growth," National Journal, 21 September 1985, pp. 2120+. (Wide-ranging review of many aspect of the debate.)

* Lehman, John F., Jr., "Talking Surface with SECNAV," Surface Warfare, September-October 1985, pp. 2-10. (SECNAV ties the strategy, surface warfare, and procurement issues together.)

** West, F. J. "Bing", Jr., "Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence," Naval War College Review, September-October 1985, pp. 5-19. (By a former Reagan administration Assistant Secretary of Defense, naval strategic thinker, and principal author of "SEAPLAN 2000," a 1978 progenitor of the Maritime Strategy. Excellent discussion of conventional protracted war and deterrence concepts underlying the strategy.)

* McDonald, ADM Wesley, "Mine Warfare: A Pillar of Maritime Strategy," Proceedings, October 1985, pp. 46-53. (By the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Actually on relationship of Maritime Strategy to NATO fleet strategy in the Atlantic, with emphasis on mine warfare.)

** Harris, CDR R. Robinson, and Benkert, LCDR Joseph, "Is That All There Is?" Proceedings, October 1985, pp. 32-37. (Surface combatants and the Maritime Strategy.)

** Powers, CAPT Robert Carney, "Commanding the Offense," Proceedings, October 1985, especially pp. 62-63. (Central strike warfare theme of the Strategy is criticized, along with the tactical organization evolved thus far for its implementation.)

** Watkins, ADM James D., "The Greatest Potential Problem: Our National Willpower," Sea Power, October 1985, p. 71. (CNO describes utility and development process of the Maritime Strategy.)

Friedman, Norman, "A Survey of Western ASW in 1985," International Defense Review, 10/1985, pp. 1587-97. (Maritime Strategy and the North Atlantic ASW campaign: Open ocean vs close-in vs convoy compaigns.)

** "Phoenix", "The SSN-21 and U.S. Maritime Strategy" Submarine Review, October 1985, pp. 27-31. (Discusses linkages between threat, strategy, and ship design. See also letter by Ulmer, CAPT D. M., April 1986, pp. 58-60, questioning using estimated Soviet intentions, vice capabilities, to drive strategy and programs. Cf McGruther article cited in Section XI below).

* Norton, CAPT Douglas M., "Responding to the Soviet Presence in Northern Waters: An American Naval View", in Archer, Clive (ed.), The Soviet Union and Northern Waters, London: Croom, Helm, 1987. (A paper presented in October 1985 at Aberdeen, Scotland as part of the dialogue between U.S. Navy strategists and allied civilian and military leaders and defense specialists).

** Wood, Robert S., and Hanley, John P., Jr., "The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic," Naval War College Review, November-December 1985, pp. 5-18. (The Naval War College faculty begins to weigh in heavily in the public debate.)

** Ullman, CDR Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "The Pacific and U.S. Naval Policy", Naval Forces, VI/1985, pp. 36-48. (Sees U.S. Navy Pacific experience as primary driver of Maritime Strategy. Especially good as the role of ADM Thomas Hayward as Pacific Fle Commander, originator of the "Sea Strike" study, and Chief of Naval Operations).

** U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, Report of the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee on the 600-Ship Navy, November 18, 1985, Washington: USGPO, 1986. (The House Seapower Subcommittee endorses the Maritime Strategy. Essential the same report is in Bennett, Rep. Charles E., "The 600-Ship Fleet: Is it Necessary?", Naval Forces, II/1986, pp. 26-38).

* Watkins, ADM James D., "Reforming the Navy From Within", Defense 85, November 1985, pp. 18-20. (The CNO on the role of the Maritime Strategy within the Navy, and its basic characteristic: "We lean heavily on our unified commanders-in-chief and Navy fl commanders to help strengthen, modernize, and then put into practice our naval strategy. This plurality of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas have made for a robust dynam strategy that recognizes and reflects the complexity of strateg issues as viewed by all key U.S. military leders worldwide, not viewed by a parochial naval bureaucracy in Washington").

Bowling, CAPT R.A., USN (Ret.), "Keeping Open the Sea-Lanes," Proceedings, December 1985, pp. 92-98. (Argues for a return to SLOC protection focus for the U.S. Navy.)

Ball, Desmond, "Nuclear War At Sea", International Security, Winter 1985-86, pp 3-31. (Argues against anti-SSBN operations for more U.S. Navy focus on the escalatory dangers of theater nuclear war at sea. Not particularly accurate).

Owens, LTCOL MacKubin Thomas, USMCR, "The Hollow Promise of JCS Reform", International Security, Winter 1985-86, pp. 98-111, especially pp. 106-109. (Links the strategy debate to the contemporaneous debate on JCS "reform": "The JCS reorganizatio debate is really a debate about strategic doctrine." Cf Best a Donatelli February 1987 articles, cited below.

Martin, Ben L., "Has There Been a Reagan Revoluation in Defens Policy?", World Affairs, Winter 1985-86, pp 173-182 (especiall 175-6). (Sees Maritime Strategy as the basis for horizontal escalation doctrine, and both important only as U.S. Navy budg rationales. "The idea of horizontal escalation itself is too inherently implausible to find an enduring place in American strategic doctrine").

II. THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATE: 1986: THE WATERSHED YEAR

In late 1985, Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General Kelley -- having ensured that the Maritime Strategy met their requirements and represented both their thinking and that of their superiors -- submitted manuscripts containing the strategy's basic tenets -- less its uncertainties and limitations -- to the Naval Institute. Following the publication of "The Maritime Strategy," a special supplement to the January 1986 Proceedings, public discussion of the strategy took on a new, sophisticated tone, more relevant to the actual requirements of U.S. national security decision making. Subsequent statements by President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and others confirmed for the public that the strategy was consistent with higher civilian and military defense guidance.

In the United States and abroad, discussions ranging from global warfare with the Soviets to naval history, fleet balance, and peacetime and crisis operations became suffused with the vocabulary and concepts of the Maritime Strategy. Much of the writing was now done by senior military officers. Most notably, a spate of broad-gauged articles by naval aviation, surface, and submarine warfare specialists appeared, transcending narrow "unionism." Knowledgeable civilian strategic thinkers and historians also offered their cogent commentary on the Strategy.

Proceedings now served as the primary forum, along with the Naval War College Review, Sea Power, and Naval Forces. The arena, however, also broadened to include more newspapers and popular magazines. The public affairs and national security journals rediscovered the Maritime Strategy, but now in a manner that brought together not only academics, pundits, and military retirees, but also serving naval professionals. By 1987, the uniformed naval officer corps once again -- as in the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan or of the pre-World War II War Plan Orange -- had captured the high ground and catalyzed thinking about the Navy's role in national and alliance strategy.

* Watkins, ADM James D., "The Maritime Strategy"; Kelley, GEN P.
** X., and O'Donnell, MAJ Hugh, "Amphibious Warfare Strategy"; and Lehman, John F., Jr., "The 600-Ship Navy"; Proceedings, January 1986 "The Maritime Strategy" Supplement. Also "Comment and Discussion": February 1986, pp 26-28; March 1986, pp 18-21 by COL John Collins USA (Ret.) (raises 20 questions); May 1986, p 25; June 1986, p 83 (questions nuclear aspects of the Strategy); and pp 84-89, by RADM William Pendley (answers Collins's questions and elaborates on the Strategy); July 1986, pp 24-27, (posits significant Soviet forward submarine operations); August 1986, p 10 (still more questions from the insatiable COL Collins); January 1987, pp 25-30 (argues for new role for PHMs in the Maritime Strategy; and April 1987, pp 22-27 (another response to COL Collins by the indefatigable RADM Pendley)).

** Gordon, Michael R., "Officials say Navy Might Attack Soviet A-Arms in Nonnuclear War", New York Times, January 7, 1986, p 1. See also (New York) Daily News, Jan 8, 1986, p C-10; The Oregonian, January 9, 1986, p C10; Los Angeles Times, January 10, 1986, p 4; Boston Globe, January 11, 1986; New York Times, January 12, 1986, p E-1; and The Times (London), February 26, 1986. (Initial press comment on publication of "The Maritime Strategy" by the Naval Institute. Ignores all strategy issues except the anti-SSBN operations debate).

* Jervell, Sverre and Nyblom, Kare (eds.), The Military Buildup in
** the High North: American and Nordic Perspectives, Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1986. (1985 Harvard conference. Eliot Cohen, Robert Weinland, Barry Posen, VADM Henry Mustin and a number of distinguished British and Nordic officials, military officers, and thinkers debate the Maritime Strategy and much else).

** Train, ADM Harry, USN (Ret.), "Seapower and Projection Forces", in American Defense Annual, 1986-1987, Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1986, pp 128-129. (This former Sixth Fleet and Atlantic Theater Commander updates his views on the Maritime Strategy. Book also contains routine arguments by Ambassador Komer. More detailed --and controversial-- views by ADM Train can be found in George, James L. (ed), The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View from the Mid-1980s, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986, pp 283-287).

Hughes, CAPT Wayne P., Jr., USN (Ret.), Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986. (By a Naval Postgraduate School faculty member. Shot through with important insights on naval strategy and its relationship to tactics. See especially Chapter 1 on the relationship between war at sea and war ashore, and Chapter 9 on the relationship between peacetime and wartime naval missions).

Connell, John, The New Maginot Line, New York: Arbor House, 1986, pp 71-81. (Another journalist--this time British--for whom the strategy debate is largely between Secretary Lehman and Ambassador Komer, and solely driven by budgetary considerations. Arguments totally derivative from other journalists. It would have been news four years earlier).

Archer, Clive and Scrivener, David (eds.), Northern Waters: Security and Resource Issues, Totowa NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1986. (A series of survey papers focusing on the Norwegian Sea. See especially Geoffrey Till on Strategy, David Hobbs on Military Technology, and Steven Miller on Reagan Administration Strategy. The Miller piece is essentially an update of his 198 paper, cited in Section I above).

Oliver, James R., and Nathan, James A., "Concepts, Continuity, and Change", in Cimbala, Stephen, (ed.), The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment, Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 1986, pp 1-22. (Sees Reagan Administration naval strategy and force planning as derived essentially from concepts and goals developed by the Navy in the late 1970s).

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Game Plan: The Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S. - Soviet Contest, Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986. (Views role of the Navy as one of "Sea Control" and projecting American power into "distant local conflicts", rather than carrier strikes on "Soviet home ports" or "strategic nuclear warfare". See pp 183-4, 191-2).

Clancy, Tom, Red Storm Rising, New York: Putnam, 1986. (Fiction. Wartime Maritime Strategy implemented under drastically changed assumptions, some plausible and some fanciful, to suit the storyteller's needs. Soviet fear of global forward pressure leads to pre-emptive seizure of Iceland, SSN surge to the Atlantic, but operations are somehow limited to Central and Northern Europe only. Inherent flexibility and lethality enables NATO navies to adapt rapidly and successfully, but with heavy losses). In this vein, see reviews by CAPT David G. Clark in Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 139-141, and ADM Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret.) in Proceedings, March 1987, p 164. Cf Hackett and McGeoch et al., The Third World War: The Untold Story, cited in Section V below; and Hayes et al., American Lake, below, Chapter 19, which addresses the Pacific in a hypothetical global war, although probably not in a manner in which CAPT Clark or ADM Hayward would agree).

** Hayes, Peter, Zarsky, Lyuba, and Bello, Walden, American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific, New York: Penguin, 1986. (Thorough and extensive analysis of the Maritime Strategy and much else, but in a shrill, leftist, Australian context. See especially Chapters 8 and 16, and Chapter 19, a fictional scenario. They understand that "What appeared a mere budget battle was in fact a conflict over military strategy").

Daniel, Donald C., Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower Strategic Stability, Champagne IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986. (An excellent survey by a Naval War College faculty member. Concludes that "It seem(s) implausible the U.S. could so reduce the number of Soviet SSBNs that the U.S.S.R. might be pushed into using the remainder". See especially pp 151-157).

** West, Francis J., Jr. et al., Naval Forces and Western Security, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986. (Contains two essays: "U.S. Naval Forces and NATO Planning" by West, pp 1-9; and "NATO's Maritime Defenses" by Jacquelyn K. Davis, James E. Dougherty, RADM Robert J. Hanks USN (Ret.) and Charles M. Perry, pp 10-53. West restates his 1985 Proceedings article assertion that there is a profound divergence between U.S. and West European perspective, on the purpose and potential contribution of naval forces in NATO contingency planning, although it is sometimes difficult to understand which Americans and Europeans he is talking about. The other essay offers an overview of current issues regarding the role of naval forces in NATO strategy).

Kaufmann, William W., A Reasonable Defense, Washington: Brookings, 1986, especially pp 72-92. (Kaufmann's annual attack on his own highly personal interpretation of the Maritime Strategy, ceding the Mediterranean totally to indigenous allied naval forces but sailing a major fleet into the Indian Ocean. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, solely aimed at influencing legislative budgetary decisions).

Cohen, Eliot A., "Do We Still Need Europe?", Commentary, January 1986, pp 28-35. (A Naval War College faculty member views NATO flanks and the Far East as of increasing importance. Sees little utility in discussions of stark strategic alternatives, e.g. "Europe vs. the Pacific, going it alone vs. having allies, keeping resolutely to the sea vs. preparing to engage the Red Army on the continent").

** "Ocean Safari '85: Meeting the Threat in the North Atlantic", All Hands, January 1986, pp 20-29. (Publicizes close-in convoy defense, coastal defense, and mine countermeasures aspects of the strategy, as well as strike warfare and tactical innovations).

** Gray, Colin, "Maritime Strategy", Proceedings, February 1986, pp 34-42. (Supportive commentary by a top-ranked civilian geopolitician and strategist. Especially helpful in untangling arguments regarding "horizontal escalation").

* "Message to Moscow: 'Be My Guest': The Navy", Newsweek, February 3, 1986, pp 16-17. (VADM Henry C. Mustin on U.S. Second Fleet implementation of the Maritime Strategy).

* U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987: Part 1, February 5, 1986, Washington: USGPO, 1986, pp 82-83. (The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testify on the budget and, in response to questioning fro Senator Nunn, on anti-SSBN operations. A key Maritime Strategy element enunciated by the highest Defense Department officials. See also Wilson, George C. and Weisskopf, Michael, "Pentagon Plan Coldly Received", Washington Post, February 6, 1986, p A14 Weinberger, Caspar, "U.S. Defense Strategy", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1986, p 695; and Andrews, Walter, "Weinberger Warns of 'Hollow Strategy'", Washington Times, July 30, 1986, p 4).

* Lehman, John F., "The U.S. Secretary of the Navy: Towards the 600-Ship Fleet", Naval Forces, No. 1/1986, pp 14-23. (Update o Lehman's thought).

* "Surface Warfare: What Does The Future Hold?", Annapolis: U.S Naval Institute Professional Seminar Series Transcript, 12 February 1986, pp 19-20. (RADM Dennis Brooks, COMCARGRU 7, on the Maritime Strategy. Another Admiral whom Stansfield Turner never met).

* U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Appropriations for 1987: Part 1, February 26, 1986, pp 500-504 and 547-550. (Admiral Watkins and Secretary Lehman respond to congressional questioning by Rep. Les AuCoin on the Maritime Strategy. "The decision to go after an SSBN in time of conflict would be a presidential decision".)

* Watkins, ADM James D., "Power Projection--Maritime Forces Making a Strategic Difference", NATO's Sixteen Nations, February-March 1986, pp 102-106. (CNO discusses Maritime Strategy within a NATO context. N.B.: this annual special issue contains articles signed by most of NATO's naval chiefs).

** Lapham, Lewis H., "Notebook: Pictures at an Exhibition", Harper's, March 1986, pp 8-9. (A bizarre, overwritten exposition on the Maritime Strategy as propaganda and the U.S. Navy as incompetent).

** Ausland, John, "The Silence on Naval Nuclear Arms Should Be Broken", International Herald Tribune, March 12, 1986, p 25. (A critical look at naval theater nuclear weapons and warfare and the Maritime Strategy).

** Reed, Fred, "Soldiering: Navy's Sensitivity Works Against It", Washington Times, March 27, 1986, p 2. (Criticizes U.S. Navy explanations of the Strategy as lacking in "strategic substance", a rather ironic criticism given the author's own arguments).

* Mustin, VADM Henry C., "The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea", Naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 2-6. (The NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander on U.S. and NATO Maritime Strategy in the Norwegian Sea). See also "In My View...", Autumn 1986, pp 101-2).

Landersman, CAPT S. D., USN (Ret.), "Naval Protection of Shipping: A Lost Art?" Naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 23-34. (By a member of the initial U.S. Navy Strategic Studies Group at Newport. Excellent critique of U.S. Navy attitudes and practices regarding Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) as well as Naval Protection of Shipping (NPS), essential but too-little-discussed aspects of the Maritime Strategy which are often overshadowed by discussion of concomitant forward operations. See also his "I am a...Convoy Commodore", Proceedings, June 1986, pp 56-63).

Kennedy, COL William V., USAR (Ret.), "New NE Asian Geography?", Naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 91-92. (An extreme view of the role of Pacific operations. Calls for a North Pacific Maritime Strategy to split the Soviet Far East from the rest of the country at the Urals).

** Doerr, CAPT P. J., "CWC Revisited", Proceedings, April 1986, pp 39-43. (Organizing the Battle Force to implement the Maritime Strategy. Contrast with CAPT Powers's October 1985 Proceedings views).

** Watkins, ADM James D., "Laurels, Accomplishments, and Violent Peace", Sea Power, April 1986, pp 6-20. (See especially pp 9-10, on the rationale for publishing the Maritime Strategy).

* Kelley, GEN P. X., "The United States Marine Corps Today", Sea Power, April 1986, pp 82-97. (See especially pp 83-86 for an overview of the Maritime Strategy from the Commandant of the Marine Corps perspective).

Bagley, ADM Worth H., USN (Ret.), "U.S. Military Power in the Pacific: Problems and Prospects", in International Security Council, National Security in Northeast Asia, New York: CAUSA Publications, April 13-15, 1986. (Reverses the usual argument by treating NATO as a "second front threat" diverting the Soviets from the Far East).

Liska, George, "From Containment to Concert", Foreign Policy, Spring 1986, pp 3-23, and "Concert Through Decompression", Summer 1986, pp 108-129. (U.S.-Soviet rivalry seen as "fed primarily by its own momentum and, at bottom, by the timeless asymmetry between land and sea powers". Argues, however, for a "land-sea power concert" by the two. "The salience of sea-over land-based power has diminished as the principal maritime power finds it increasingly difficult to maintain clear naval superiority").

** "The United States Navy: On the Crest of the Wave", The Economist, April 19, 1986, pp 49-65. (Strategy and programs).

** Hart, Senator Gary, with Lind, William S., America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform, Bethesda MD: Adler & Adler, 1986, pp 77-81. (Criticizes the Maritime Strategy for its linkages to the land war in Europe, its early forward focus, and its relationship to current force structure. Major concern, however, seems to be with the semantics of the term "Maritime Strategy").

** Ausland, John, C., Nordic Security and the Great Powers, Boulder CO: Westview, 1986. (Comprehensive and detailed treatment of the Maritime Strategy in peace and war within the overall context of Nordic military security. See especially Chapter 20, "The Battle for the Norwegian Sea", the author's "climax").

* Hughes, VADM Thomas J., Jr., "Logistics Became Legitimate", Sea Power, May 1986, pp 17-24, especially p 22. (By the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics. "The logistics of the Navy are matched to our maritime strategy").

** Ullman, CDR Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "Precept for Tomorrow: A Busy Agenda Awaits the Next CNO", Sea Power, May 1986, pp 48-51. (Sees a need for the new Chief of Naval Operations to examine the future maritime environment as well as the reactions of U.S. and foreign political and military leaders to the Maritime Strategy).

** Wettern, Desmond, "Maritime Strategy: Change or Decay", Navy International, May 1986, pp 304-308. (Endorsement of the Maritime Strategy by a prominent British naval affairs writer. Questions, however, whether SLOC interdiction remains as low a Soviet priority under ADM Chernavin as it did under ADM Gorshkov).

** "Bridge Over Troubled Waters", Defense and Foreign Affairs, May 1986, pp 38-9. (On the U.S. Navy's efforts to link technology and weapons acquisition to the Maritime Strategy).

* "Sailing the Cold Seas", Surface Warfare, May-June 1986, pp 6-8. (On the steps being examined and taken to increase U.S. Navy ability to operate in northern latitudes as required by the Maritime Strategy).

Williams, CDR E. Cameron, USNR, "The Four 'Iron Laws' of Naval Protection of Merchant Shipping", Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, pp 35-42. (An argument for convoying. Sees the SLOC protection debate as between convoying and "sanitized lanes". Oblivious, however, to the debate between either or both of these options and forward defense, the more topical issue.) See also "In My View," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1986, pp. 108-109, and Spring 1987, pp. 91-92.

* Pendley, RADM William, "Comment and Discussion: The Maritime Strategy", Proceedings, June 1986, pp 84-89. (This ostensible response to an earlier "Comment and Discussion" item is actually an important official amplification of the Maritime Strategy by the 1985-86 Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60), the Navy's principal global strategist).

** Mather, Ian, "NATO Row Over Boundary Shift", Sunday London Observer, June 16, 1986. (Sees Secretary of Defense Weinberger's call for an expanded NATO reach beyond Europe as derived from the Maritime Strategy).

* Samuel, Peter, "State Dept., Navy Agree on Opening Pacific Front
** in Case of War in Europe", New York City Tribune, 23 June 1986, p 1. (State Department's Director of Policy Planning espouses views congruent with the Maritime Strategy, especially regarding global nature of war with the Soviet Union and early anti-submarine operations). For an updated version of these views, see Solomon 1987 article cited below. See also Bedard, Paul, "Pacific Waters Boil With American and Soviet Warships", Defense Week, June 23, 1986, p 1; and Elliott, Frank, "U.S. Looks to Pacific Fleet to Help Europe" and "Soviet Power Grows", Navy Times, July 7, 1986, pp 29 & 32.

** Epstein, Joshua M., The 1987 Defense Budget, Washington: Brookings, 1986. (Brookings's annual attack on the Maritime Strategy. Pp 13, 41-45, and 55-58 reject the Maritime Strategy as "inefficient and potentially escalatory" and recommend U.S. Navy force posture cuts accordingly. Sees defense of Norway as not requiring significant U.S. naval forces. Arguments derived from Kaufmann, Komer, Posen, and the Congressional Budget Office. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-driven document).

** Gray, Colin S., "Keeping the Soviets Landlocked: Geostrategy for a Maritime America", The National Interest, Summer 1986, pp 24-36. (Masterful discussion of the relationships between geopolitics and the Maritime Strategy).

** Wood, Robert and Hanley, John, "The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic", Atlantic Community Quarterly, Summer 1986, pp 133-144. (Latest incarnation of this oft-reprinted article by two Naval War College faculty members).

** Polmar, Norman, "The Soviet Navy: Nuclear War at Sea", Proceedings, July 1986, pp 111-113. See also "Comment and Discussion", Proceedings, September 1986, p 90. ("The Maritime Strategy must be challenged for its lack of definition in how we are to deter nuclear war at sea").

** Defense Choices: Greater Security with Fewer Dollars, Washington: Committee for National Security, 1986. (The Committee's annual attack on the Maritime Strategy and the 600-Ship Navy. "There is no need to ask the U.S. Fleet to take on high risk missions close to Soviet shores". Advocates a "return to a more sensible naval strategy". Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-driven document. This study achieved a certain notoriety due to its endorsement by Dr. Larry Korb, a former Reagan Administration defense official and earlier advocate of a 600-ship Navy).

** Stefanick, Tom, "Attacking the Soviet Sea Based Deterrent: Clever Feint or Foolhardy Maneuver?", F.A.S. Public Interest Report, June-July 1986, pp 1-10. (The author seems to lean more to the "foolhardy maneuver" persuasion. "The U.S. must reduce the current emphasis on submarine operations in waters heavily defended by the Soviet Union." But cf his December article, below).

** Truver, Scott C., "Can We Afford The 15-Carrier Battle Group Navy?", Armed Forces Journal International, July 1986, pp 74-81. (On the relationship between the Maritime Strategy and carrier force levels).

O'Rourke, Ronald, "Tomahawk: The U.S. Navy's New Option", Navy International, July 1986, pp 394-398. (Good coverage of the benefits and problems associated with integrating sea-launched cruise missiles into the Maritime Strategy).

Ryan, CAPT T. D., "SUBDEVRON TWELVE: In the Global War Games", Submarine Review, July 1986, pp 39-40. (Good examples of uses of Naval War College Global War Games to test the Maritime Strategy and to identify problems needing new technological and tactical solutions).

** Winkler, Philippa, "A Dangerous Shift in Naval Strategy", Oakland Tribune, 7 July 1986. (Decries the Navy's "forward offensive strategy" for going "beyond legitimate defense purposes").

Canby, Steven L., "South Korea's Defense Requires U.S. Air Power, Not Troops", Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1986, p 24. (Sees limited utility of Pacific Fleet carriers in a war with the Soviets. Advocates naval force level cuts).

** O'Shea, James, "U.S. to Sink Billions into New Attack Sub". Chicago Tribune, July 20, 1986, p 1. (On the role of the SSN-21 Seawolf in the future Maritime Strategy).

Smith, Lee, "How the Pentagon Can Live On Less", Fortune, 21 July 1986, pp 78-85. (See especially p 87. Fortune and ex-Reagan Administration official Richard DeLauer oppose as misguided the "Lehman developed" "forward strategy", construed as carrier strikes on Murmansk, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk). For more on DeLauer's negative views, see "Interview: Richard DeLauer on Defense", Technology Review, July 1986, pp 58-67).

* "Maritime Strategy Seminar", Proceedings, August 1986, pp 8-10.
** (Former SACLANT/CINCLANT ADM Wesley McDonald, former Undersecretary of Defense Robert Komer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing West, and then-U.S. Second Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander VADM Henry Mustin debate the Maritime Strategy. For more details, see the excellent Maritime Strategy Seminar Transcript, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1986).

** Polmar, Norman, "600 Ships-Plus or Minus?", Proceedings, August 1986, pp 107-108. The author's views on the relationship between the Strategy and the 600-Ship Navy force level goals. "While some would argue with specific components of both the strategy and the ships that Lehman seeks, it is a coherent and long-term plan...one that Congress has long demanded from the Navy and the other services").

** Parry, Don, "U.S. Navy's Role in Space", Navy International, August 1986, p 477. (Quotes Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for C^3 and Space Ann Berman on the role of space in the Maritime Strategy).

** Hinge, LT A., RAN, "The Strategic Balance in the Asia-Pacific Region: Naval Aspects", Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, August 1986, pp 31-50. (Poses important questions regarding USN force posture requirements in each oceanic theater, and potential naval roles of Pacific allies, China, and ASEAN. Very sanguine regarding Western maritime superiority in the Pacific).

"Rust to Riches: The Navy is Back", U.S. News and World Report, August 4, 1986, pp 28-37. (SECNAV John Lehman's influence on naval strategy seen as paramount).

Isherwood, Julien, "Russia Warns Oslo on U.S. Base", Daily Telegraph, August 13, 1986. (Cites major Soviet propaganda offensive against forward battle group operations in the Norwegian Sea, "the so-called Lehman Doctrine").

"Aircraft Carriers Use Technology, Speed to Stage Vanishing Acts on High Seas", Baltimore Sun, 17 August 1986, p 16. (Discusses U.S. Navy countermeasures to Soviet intelligence and targeting at sea, a key element in carrying out the Maritime Strategy).

Bunting, Glenn F., "Navy Warms up to Idea of Presence in Cold Bering Sea", Los Angeles Times, 31 August 1986, p 3. (Maritime Strategy as reflected in increased U.S. Navy peacetime North Pacific presence).

* Demars, VADM Bruce, "The U.S. Submarine Force", Naval Forces, IV/1986, pp 18-30 and "Speech at the Submarine Symposium, Lima, Peru", Submarine Review, January 1987, pp 5-12. (By the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare. See especially pp 20-21 of the former and 8-11 of the latter on the role of U.S. and allied submarines in the Maritime Strategy: "We dare not go it alone").

** Drury, F., "Naval Strike Warfare and the Outer Air Battle", Naval Forces, IV/1986, pp 46-52. (Sees the Maritime Strategy as merging the two concepts, which he feels had grown apart, into one coherent plan to defeat the Soviet air threat).

** Tellis, Ashley J., "The Soviet Navy, Central America and the Atlantic Alliance", Naval Forces, IV/1986, pp 54-60. (Endorses the Maritime Strategy for its geopolitical logic, especially regarding forward operations).

* Cropsey, Seth, "Forward Defense or Maginot Line? The Maritime Strategy and its Alternatives", Policy Review, Fall 1986, pp 40-46. (An excellent restatement of the Navy's arguments by the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy. Particularly useful on the historical background of the Maritime Strategy).

* Mustin, VADM Henry C., "Maritime Strategy from the Deckplates", Proceedings, September 1986, pp 33-37. (U.S. Navy Second Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander's positive views on the utility of the Maritime Strategy to an operational commander. See also "Comment and Discussion", November 1986, p 14).

Hampton, LCDR J. P., "Integrated Air Defense for NATO", Proceedings, September 1986, pp 114-116. (On integrating U.S. Navy carrier battle groups with U.S. and allied air force aircraft to counter the Soviet air threat on the NATO Southern Front: an essential component of the Maritime Strategy too often overshadowed in the public debate by discussion of the Northwest Pacific and especially the Norwegian Sea).

** Wood, Robert S., "Maritime Strategy for War in the North", Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, September 1986, pp 17-20. (Development of this Naval War College faculty member/strategist's thought. Stress on combined arms).

** Fouquet, David, "NATO Soldiers March Into Autumn, Testing Tactics, Equipment, Systems", Defense News, September 15, 1986, p 14. (The Allies test the Maritime Strategy on the Northern Front).

* Lehman, Hon. John F., Jr., Maritime Strategy in the Defense of NATO, Washington: CSIS, September 25, 1986. (His 1986 views: "No maritime strategy can be a successful strategy without an effective land deterrent on the continent of Europe". "The forward strategy, articulated by the Reagan administration, is in fact orthodoxy of the oldest sort, conforming precisely to NATO alliance doctrine". "In summary we have a maritime strategy in the defense of NATO that is universally accepted by the maritime forces of Europe and the United States").

** Gray, Colin S., Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West, New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1986. (An extension of his classic 1977 work on geopolitics, focusing on implications for U.S. national military strategy. The footnotes include some excellent rebuttals to the arguments of Ambassador Komer. A new classic).

** Mearsheimer, John, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe", International Security, Fall 1986, pp 3-57. (Despite its biases, distortions, and misleading discussions of the development of the Maritime Strategy over time, probably the most important piece of writing critical of the Strategy to date. Faults the Maritime Strategy for its "elastic quality", actually regarded by U.S. naval officers as one of its great deterrent and warfighting strengths. This West Point graduate and former U.S. Air Force officer's bottom line: "The key to deterrence is not the Navy, but the forces that will be fighting on the Central Front. Those forces should be given first priority when deciding how to allocate defense budgets").

** Brooks, CAPT Linton, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy", International Security, Fall 1986, pp 58-87. (One of the Strategy's contributors definitively expands on its basic elements and on its rationale. Especially useful in discussing the rationale for anti-SSBN operations and the Strategy's inherent uncertainties, integral aspects of the Maritime Strategy often slighted in public official U.S. Navy discussions).

* Schoultz, VADM Robert F., "Strikefleet: Cost-Effective Power", Armed Forces, October 1986, pp 446-448. (Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare on the role of the Carrier Battle Group in the Maritime Strategy).

** Winnefeld, LT James A., Jr., "Topgun: Getting It Right", Proceedings, October 1986, pp 141-146. (The Navy Fighter Weapons School seen as a key contributor to the Maritime Strategy's execution, by the School's training officer, one of the new generation of naval officers for whom the Maritime Strategy is truly the cornerstone of his profession).

* Weinberger, Caspar, "The Spirit and Meaning of the USS Theodore Roosevelt", Defense Issues, Vol 1 No 76, November 24, 1986. (The Maritime Strategy as a component of national military strategy, by the Secretary of Defense. "The greatest value of President Reagan's maritime strategy is that it focuses on the crucial issue of how we can best use our maritime forces and those of our allies to achieve the basic goal of deterrence -- and deny the adversary his preferred warfighting strategy"). Summarized in Wilson, George, "USS Theodore Roosevelt Joins Active Service as 15th Carrier", Washington Post, October 26, 1986, p A21; and Matthews, William, "Carrier Theodore Roosevelt 'Charges' to Life", Navy Times, November 10, 1986, pp 33 & 37.

** "U.S. Maritime Strategy for the 1980s", Security Digest, (The Wilson Center), November 1986. (CAPT Linton Brooks and Prof. John Mearsheimer debate the Maritime Strategy).

** Morring, Frank, Jr., "Navy Chief: 'Forward Defense' Doesn't Mean Kamakazi Missions", Nashua (NH) Telegraph, 26 November 1986. (First reported public discussion of the Maritime Strategy by the new CNO, ADM Carlisle Trost, with a critique by Brookings Institution researcher Joshua Epstein).

** Friedman, Norman, "U.S. Strategy and ASW", Jane's Defense Weekly, 29 November 1986, pp 1269-1277. (An update of Dr. Friedman's thought on the Maritime Strategy, ASW, and the SSN-21).

* "The Future Mix of Subs and Strategy", Proceedings, December
** 1986, pp 11-12. (The Director of U.S. Navy Attack Submarine Programs, the Naval War College Professor of Submarine Warfare, and two noted civilian naval analysts debate the role of the U.S. submarine force in the Maritime Strategy. For more than this brief summary, see "The Future Mix of Subs and Strategy", Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Professional Seminar Series, 25 September 1986).

** O'Neil, Captain W. D., USNR, "Executing the Maritime Strategy", Proceedings, December 1986, pp 39-41. (Recommends measures that the U.S. Navy must take to ensure the continued executablity of the Maritime Strategy, by keeping the Soviets on the defensive and improving defense penetration and strike effectiveness).

** Stefanick, Tom A., "America's Maritime Strategy -- The Arms Control Implications", Arms Control Today, December 1986, pp 10-17. (Appears to favor the Maritime Strategy more than he did in July. "The implicit threat to Soviet ballistic missile submarines during a conventional naval conflict would be likely to yield an advantage to the U.S. Navy in the conventional balance at sea... The likelihood of widespread escalation of the use of nuclear weapons as a direct result of threats or even attacks on Soviet SSBNs in their home waters appears to be low.")

** "Dossier: U.S. Report", Naval Forces, VI/1986, p 132. (Alleges there is current "indecision about what a U.S. maritime strategy should comprise". A remarkable piece of reportage for October 1986. There's always 10% who don't get the word).

* Matthews, William, "Marines Would Storm by Air, Not Sea if NATO Attacked", Navy Times, December 1, 1986. (Despite the misleading headline, an otherwise generally accurate rendering of the views of the principal USMC global strategist, BGEN Michael Sheridan, on the role of the Marines in North Norway, as part of the Maritime Strategy).

** Halloran, Richard, "A Silent Battle Surfaces", New York Times Magazine, December 7, 1986, pp 60, 94-97. (On the anti-submarine warfare component of the Maritime Strategy).

** Elliott, Frank, "Exon Says Maritime Plan Could Trigger War", Defense Week, December 8, 1986, p 16. (Senator Exon opposes the anti-SSBN aspects of the Maritime Strategy. "There are good elements in that strategy, but much of it concerns me").

Greeley, Brendan M., Jr., "Third Fleet Increases North Pacific Operations to Counter Soviet Activity", Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 22, 1986, pp 28-29. (On VADM Diego Hernandez and the Third Fleet North Pacific build-up, especially joint and allied coordination).

* U.S. Navy Appears to Expand Operations in Pacific Ocean", Jane's Defense Weekly, 27 December 1986, pp 1474-1475. (Interview with VADM Hernández on new peacetime measures to more successfully deter war or -- should deterrence fail -- conduct wartime operations in the North Pacific in accordance with the Maritime Strategy).

III. THE DEBATE CONTINUES: 1987 AND BEYOND

The first half of 1987 saw the Maritime Strategy firmly in place as an acknowledged vital element of U.S. and allied military strategy. President Reagan, Defense Secretary Weinberger, Deputy Defense Secretary Taft, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Crowe, all publicly cited its importance and utility. Likewise, James H. Webb, Jr. (John Lehman's successor as SECNAV), Admiral Carlisle Trost (Admiral Watkins' successor as CNO), and a number of other top flag officers provided numerous examples of the extent to which it had become the common strategic framework of the naval leadership. Perhaps the best illustration of this phenomenon was, however, the July 1987 issue of the Proceedings. Therein, the Maritime Strategy formed the baseline for a wide range of discussions of specific U.S. and allied peacekeeping and warfighting issues: by active duty U.S. Navy junior officers, senior officers, and admirals; by naval aviators, surface warfare officers, submariners and a Marine; and by officers concerned with inter-allied relations, regional strategic objectives, fleet operations, and weapons system employment and development.

The second half of 1987 and 1988 promise to add yet another dimension to the discussion: a number of book-length treatments of the Maritime Strategy and related subjects are scheduled for publication. That the 1980s saw a long-needed burgeoning of naval strategic thought, both in the United States and abroad, has become indisputable. What remains to be seen is what use future generations of planners, policymakers, and thinkers will make of this outpouring.

* Reagan, President Ronald, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington: the White House, January 1987. (The framework within which the Maritime Strategy operates. Clear focus on global, forward, coalition approach, especially vs. the Soviets. See especially p 19: "U.S. military forces must possess the capability, should deterrence fail, to expand the scope and intensity of combat operations, as necessary"; and pp 27-30: "maritime superiority is vital. (It) enables us to capitalize on Soviet geographic vulnerabilities and to pose a global threat to the Soviet's interests. It plays a key role in plans for the defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. It also permits the United States to tie down Soviet naval forces in a defensive posture protecting Soviet ballistic missile submarines and the seaward approaches to the Soviet homeland...").

* Weinberger, Caspar W., Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1988/FY 1989 Budget and FY 1988-92 Defense Programs, Washington: USGPO, 1987, p 165. (Reconfirms the Maritime Strategy as a component of declared U.S. national military strategy. See also Offley, Ed, and Sanger, S.L. "Backing at Top for Home Port", Seattle Post-Intelligencer, April 28 1987, p 1. (SECDEF, in Seattle, "agrees with the Navy's controversial wartime strategy". SECDEF direction and endorsement is no flash in the pan).

* Crowe, ADM William J., "Statement on National Security Strategy", U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth Congress, First Session, Hearings on National Security Strategy, January 21, 1987, Washington: USGPO, 1987 (forthcoming). (Solid concurrence in the Maritime Strategy by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "In recent years we have benefited from some excellent conceptual thinking by the Navy about global maritime strategy--how to phase operations in a transition from peace to war, clear the way of submarines opposing military resupply or reinforcement shipping, and use our carrier battle groups for either offensive strikes or in direct support of such allies as Japan, Norway, Greece, and Turkey. It is imperative, of course, to fold these concepts into our larger military strategy and that is exactly what we are doing").

* Trost, ADM Carlisle, "Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy", Proceedings, January 1987, pp 13-16. Also "Comment and Discussion": July 1987, pp 19-20. (Admiral Watkins's successor as CNO briefly reaffirms the Maritime Strategy's fundamentals: deterrence, forward defense, alliance solidarity, the global view, coexistence with other vital components of our national military strategy, and -- most important -- flexibility. Highlights anti-submarine warfare in particular).

* U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth Congress, First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Washington DC: USGPO (forthcoming in 1987/8). (Prepared annual "posture" statements by SECDEF, CJCS, SECNAV, CNO, and other officials. Also hearings repartee, and responses to questions for the record. Maritime Strategy permeates the entire Navy budget legislative process. In addition to those just cited see especially statements by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Melvyn Paisley, CINCLANTFLT ADM Frank Kelso, and Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Surface and Air Warfare, VADMs Joseph Metcalf and Robert Dunn).

* U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth
** Congress, First Session, Hearings on National Security Strategy, January-April 1987, Washington: USGPO (forthcoming in 1987/8). (Testimony by administration civilian and military officials, and by government and non-government defense specialists. Includes much discussion of the Maritime Strategy. See especially testimony by ADM Lee Baggett, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command).

Hendrickson, David C., The Future of American Strategy, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987. (A new and different perspective. Advocates a scaled-back mix of continental and maritime strategies and forces. Sees some U.S. naval forces particularly useful in Third World contingencies, especially carriers, but would cut back on naval--and air and ground--forces he sees as only useful for highly unlikely forward global operations against the Soviets. Wrongly believes this includes Aegis cruisers and destroyers).

** Brooks, CAPT Linton, "Conflict Termination Through Maritime Leverage", in Cimbala, Steven and Dunn, Keith (eds.), Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War, Boulder CO: Westview, 1987. (Actually written a year before his 1986 International Security article, for a 1985 Naval War College conference on war termination).

** Kaufmann, William W., A Thoroughly Efficient Navy, Washington: Brookings, 1987. (The annual Kaufmann broadside, this time designed to influence the congressional votes on carrier construction. See especially Chapter 2, "The Maritime Strategy").

** Stefanick, Tom A., Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and Naval Strategy, Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1987.

** Luttwak, Edward N., Strategy, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1987, pp 156-164, & 268. (Cursory discussion of the Maritime Strategy as "nonstrategy").

** Van Cleave, William R., "Horizontal Escalation and NATO Strategy: A Conceptual Overview", in E.F Gueritz et al (eds.), NATO's Maritime Strategy: Issues and Developments, Washington: Pergamon - Brassey's, 1987. (A leading conservative defense thinker argues that "the Navy's version of Horizontal Escalation" -- the Maritime Strategy -- "fails because it does not come to grips with the nuclear factor - indeed, it seems to attempt ignoring it.").

** West, F. J. ("Bing"), Jr., "The Maritime Strategy: The Next Step", Proceedings, January 1987, pp 40-49. (By a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Naval War College faculty member, lead author of Seaplan 2000 and U.S. Marine Corps officer. One of the most important analyses of the Maritime Strategy by an outside observer to date. Develops further his 1985 and 1986 views, cited in "Contemporary Naval Strategy" and Section II above, on the relationships between the Strategy and U.S./NATO doctrine. Cf, however, actual statements by allied military leaders in Section V below). See also "Comment and Discussion": March 1987, pp 14-15; July 1987, pp 19-20, and August 1987, pp 31-32.

** Gray, Colin S., "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: The Implications for NATO", Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 8-19. (A thoughtful, wide-ranging, and often provocative article examining linkages, especially between continental and maritime power, between the European and Pacific theaters, and between strategic and conventional deterrence. The article is notable also for the contributions of CAPT Roger W. Barnett, USN (Ret.), one of the foremost original architects of the Maritime Strategy).

** Solomon, Richard H., "The Pacific Basin: Dilemmas and Choices for American Security", Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 36-43, especially pp 38-39. (The Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff updates his June 1986 Naval War College Current Strategy Forum lecture: "We must be prepared to open a second front in Asia").

"From the Editor", Submarine Review, January 1987, pp 3-5. (Challenges some of the basic strategic concepts of the Maritime Strategy regarding the employment of SSNs).

* Connors, LCDR Tracy, "Northern Wedding '86", All Hands, January 1987, pp 18-26. See also "Cape Wrath Feels Iowa's Fury", "Nimitz and Northern Wedding", and "Alaska", in same issue. (VADM Charles R. Larson, Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic: "We went north to test tactics designed to support NATO's maritime strategy of forward defense. I am proud to report those tactics worked").

** Thomas, CAPT Walter 'R', USN (Ret.), "Deterrence, Defense, Two Different Animals", Navy Times, January 26, 1987, p 23. (Critique of John Mearsheimer's Fall 1986 International Security article).

** Keller, LT Kenneth C., "The Surface Ship in ASW", Surface Warfare, Jan/Feb 1987, pp 2-3. ("Any future ASW conflict, by necessity, will be fought in accordance with the maritime strategy". Another of the new generation of naval officers gets--and passes--the word).

** Doerr, CAPT Peter J., USN (Ret.), "Comment and Discussion: Large Carriers: A Matter of Time", Proceedings, February 1987, p 78. (On the "defense within an offense within a defense" nature of the putative Battle of the Norwegian Sea and, by implication, other potential wartime operations implementing the Maritime Strategy globally).

Tritten, CDR James J., "(Non) Nuclear Warfare", Proceedings, February 1987, pp 64-70. (By the Chairman of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. On the symbiotic nature of nonnuclear and nuclear warfare, at sea and ashore, under conditions of crisis response, intra-war deterrence, and warfighting).

** Best, Richard, "Will JCS Reform Endanger The Maritime Strategy?", National Defense: February 1987, pp 26-30. ("The passage of JCS reform will provide a future administration with a handle on defense policy that will allow it to override previous strategic conceptions, including the Navy's maritime strategy, (which) will come under heavy criticism by those using arguments derived from the approach of the systems analysts." Best decries this since "only the Navy has thought through the implications of the continuum of operations in a way which will not cause civilian populations to shrink in horror").

** O'Rourke, Ronald, "U.S. Forward Maritime Strategy", Navy International, February 1987, pp 118-122. (Especially good on the "complex, interactive relationship" between the Maritime Strategy and the 600-ship Navy, and on "the issues". Less useful--because occasionally inaccurate--in tracing the prehistory and history of the Strategy, probably because of deficiencies in the public record).

** Donatelli, Thomas, "Go Navy", The American Spectator, February 1987, pp 31-33. (On the linkages between defense reorganization and the maritime elements of the national military strategy. Supports the Maritime Strategy, and fears for its future under the new Defense Department set-up).

Matthews, William, "U.S. Navy's Exercises in Aleutians Underscore Pacific Interest Concern", Defense News, February 9, 1987, p 25. (Reprinted as "Marines, Navy Test Amphibious Skills in Aleutians", Navy Times, February 16, p 27). (The Navy and Marine Corps practice cold-weather operations to implement the Maritime Strategy in the North Pacific).

** Lynch, David J., "Maritime Plan A 'Prescription For Disaster' Educator Says", Defense Week, February 23, 1987, p 12. (Professor Mearsheimer again, this time at the American Association for the Advancement of Science).

** O'Rourke, Ronald, "Nuclear Escalation, Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and the Navy's Forward Maritime Strategy", Washington: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, February 27, 1987. (Especially useful for Navy staff officer views).

Wood, Robert, "The Conceptual Framework for Strategic Development at the Naval War College", Naval War College Review, Spring 1987, pp 4-16. (Further development of the views of this Naval War College strategist/faculty member. His focus is now on integrated national military strategy and its teaching and gaming. See also commentary by RADM J. A. Baldwin, President of the Naval War College, pp. 2-3).

Piotti, RADM Walter T., Jr., "Interview", Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, Vol 5 #2, 1987, pp 14-16. (The Commander of the U.S. Military Sealift Command on global wartime planning for sealift).

** Pocalyko, LCDR Michael, "Neutral Sweden Toughens NATO's Northern Tier", Proceedings, March 1987, pp 128-130. (By a 1985-86 member of the Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). On the interrelationships among Swedish, Soviet, and NATO strategies and the Maritime Strategy).

** Daskal, Steven E., "Added Sealift Protection in Time of War", National Defense, March 1987, pp 38-41. (Recommends a variety of merchant ship self protection measures for wartime, given the realities of the Maritime Strategy and U.S./allied force levels).

** "Analysis: U.S. Carriers", RUSI, March 1987, pp 1+. (Drags out yet again the false choice between a Continental or Maritime Strategy as an issue. Claims West Germany "would object strongly if moves were made to convert the Maritime Strategy into the U.S.'s general war strategy". It is, in part, and they haven't, at all. Cf Bonn's actual White Paper 1985, cited in Section V below).

** Grove, Eric, "The Future of Sea Power," Naval Forces, II/1987, pp 12-28. (Excellent tour d'horizon, showing where the Maritime Strategy fits in the context of total world sea power issues today).

* Dunn, VADM Robert F., "NANiews Interview", Naval Aviation News, March-April 1987, p 4. (The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare comments on "today's maritime strategy in terms of its effects on Naval Aviation": "Tactical commanders must deal with the strategy on a day to day basis. From that derives a new tactical awareness").

Taylor, RADM R.A.K., "BBBG Power: Validated!", Surface Warfare, March/April 1987, pp 2-5, (Testing Battleship Battle Group warfighting concepts at sea, an important element of the Maritime Strategy). See also Matthews, William, "Navy Leans to Battleships With More Cruise Missiles", Navy Times, April 13, 1987, pp 37-38, and Defense News, April 13, 1987, p 35; and Halloran, Richard, "Warship Cleared for Duty off Iran," New York Times, April 12, 1987, p 32.

** "Push Anti-Mine Work, Navy Urged", Defense Week, March 2, 1987, p 5. (RADM J.S. Tichelman, RNLN, argues that emphasis on minesweeping "should go hand in hand with the forward strategy" at a U.S. Naval Institute Seminar on Mine Warfare).

** Daggett, Stephen and Husbands, Jo L., Achieving an Affordable Defense: A Military Strategy to Guide Military Spending, Washington: Committee for National Security, March 10, 1987. (The annual CNS attack, using the usual W.W. Kaufmann "data" and arguments. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, solely designed to influence the U.S. legislative budget process). A summary is in Korb, Lawrence J. and Daggett, Stephen, "A 15-Carrier Navy: Is it Really Necessary?", Defense News, March 30, 1987, p 27, reprinted as "15 Carrier Navy Leaves Forces out of Balance", Navy Times, April 6, 1987, p 32, and criticized by R.C. Mandeville in "Experts Only", Navy Times, April 27, 1987, p 22.

** Wilson, George C., "600-Ship Navy is Sailing Toward Rough Fiscal Seas", Washington Post, March 16, 1987, pp A1 & A6. (Sees forward anti-SSBN operations as a "Watkins" "scenario" and forward carrier battle group operations as a "Lehman" "scenario", with little backing in the officer corps. Cites a "number of (nameless) Navy officers" as predicting that the latter "aspect of the forward strategy will start fading as soon as Lehman leaves the Navy Department". This seems doubtful, given the primary role of the officer corps in drafting the Maritime Strategy; time will tell. See also retort by Bennett, Rep Charles E., "A 600 Ship Fleet is What's Needed", Washington Post, April 22, 1987, p 19.

** Cushman, John H., Jr., "Navy Warns of Crisis in Anti-Submarine Warfare", New York Times, March 19, 1987, p 19. (Outgoing Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Engineering and Systems Melvyn Paisley on need for increased Navy ASW research: "We are faced with a crisis in our anti-submarine warfare capability which undermines our ability to execute maritime strategy". For context, however, see actual Paisley statements before congressional committees, 1987).

** Trainor, LTGEN Bernard E., USMC (Ret.), "Lehman's Sea-War Strategy is Alive, But for How Long?", New York Times, March 23, 1987, p 16. (Another article in the "Will-the-Strategy-survive-John-Lehman?" vein. General Trainor's understanding of the uniformed navy, joint and allied aspects of the strategy do not appear to be on a par with his understanding of the Marine Corps aspects).

* Dorsey, Jack, "NATO Navy Called 'A Constant Source of Pride'", Virginian Pilot, March 28, 1987, p 133. (Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV: It is "naive and dangerous" to believe that strong naval forces are merely expensive competitors to ground forces in Europe, an argument that has become fashionable in recent years for critics of naval programs and maritime strategy).

** Trainor, LTGEN Bernard E., USMC (Ret.), "NATO Nations Conducting Winter Maneuvers in Northern Norway", New York Times, March 29, 1987, p 14. (Practicing the reinforcement of North Norway. BGEN Matthew Caulfield USMC: "Marine reinforcement is part of our maritime strategy". GEN Fredrik Bull-Hansen RNA: With or without American carriers, northern Norway will be defended).

** Lessner, Richard, "Quick Strike: Navy Secretary's Wartime Strategy Is Contested Legacy", Arizona Republic, March 29,1987 pp C1+. (Comprehensive discussion of the issues, including a lengthy interview with Secretary Lehman on the eve of his departure from office, on his Maritime Strategy opinions. Contributes, however, to the erroneous view--running throughout America journalism--that the Strategy was solely his creation).

* Goodman, Glenn W. Jr. and Schemmer, Benjamin F., "An Exclusive AFJ Interview with Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost", Armed Forces Journal International, April 1987, pp 76-84, especially p 79. (The Chief of Naval Operations discusses his views on the Maritime Strategy, including forward pressure, anti-SSBN operations, and relations with the NATO allies. "Our intent is to hold Soviet maritime forces at risk in the event of war. That includes anything that is out there").

Liebman, Marc, "Soviet Naval Initiatives in the Pacific: 1942 Revisited?", Armed Forces Journal International, April 1987, pp 58-64. (On Pacific maritime operations during a global war with the Soviets).

Truver, Scott C. and Thompson, Jonathan S., "Navy Mine Countermeasures: Quo Vadis?", Armed Forces Journal International, April 1987, pp 70-74. (An adequate survey of the problems and prospects. No discussion, however, of the primary U.S. mine countermeasures concept of operations embedded in the Maritime Strategy: killing minelayers far forward, in transit, and offshore, before they sow their mines. Illustrative of the dangers of discussing any one warfare area in isolation from the total Strategy).

** Brooks, CAPT Linton, "The Nuclear Maritime Strategy", Proceedings, April 1987 pp 33-39. (A major contributor to the Maritime Strategy thinks it through under the highly unlikely conditions of nuclear war at sea. An important and prize-winning essay). See also "Comment and Discussion", May 1987, pp 14, 17, and August 1987, pp 27-28.

** Cross, LTCOL Michael J., USMC, "No More Carrier Debates, Please", Proceedings, April 1987, pp 79-81. (Relates the Maritime Strategy's requirements to the CVN-CVV debate).

* "Individual Human Beings and the Responsibilities of Leadership", Sea Power, April 1987, pp 81-96. (Valedictory interview with Secretary Lehman. See p 85 for his parting view on the Maritime Strategy).

Bliss, Elsie, "Fleet Hardening: Responding to the Nuclear Threat", All Hands, April 1987, pp 30-31. (On USN efforts to "harden" its ships, aircraft, and equipment against nuclear attack).

** "Naval Strategy: America Rules the Waves?", Science, April 3, 1987, p. 24. (Another journalistic attempt to summarize the debate. A little better than most).

Sea-War Plan All Wet?", Columbus Dispatch, April 7, 1987, p 10A. (A call for a "vigorous review" by the Pentagon of "Lehman's plan", including "aircraft carrier battle groups...sent to the...Barents, (a plan) never...formally approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, or NATO." As has often been the case with public journalistic commentary on the Maritime Strategy, no mention was made of the extent to which the Strategy reflects longstanding JCS, SECDEF, or NATO policy and strategy, or of its roots in the naval officer corps).

* Smith, LTGEN Keith A., "The Posture of Marine Aviation in FY 88 - FY 89", Marine Corps Gazette, May 1987, pp 46+. (U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation on Marine aviation requirements to support the national, maritime, and amphibious strategies. A reprint of earlier Congressional testimony).

** Beatty, Jack, "In Harm's Way", The Atlantic, May 1987, pp. 37-53. (Having listened to naval leaders and to college professors, Beatty sides with the college professors. His criticisms, however, pale beside Theo Rudnak's sensationalist artwork). See also August 1987, pp 6-10, for retorts by Norman Friedman, Richard Best, Mark Jordan, Bing West and Colin Grag, and a final rejoinder by Beatty, who apparently believes the Maritime Strategy calls for carrier operationsw in the Black Sea.

Matthews William, "Webb Downplays 'Forward Strategy' Issue", Navy Times, May 4, 1987, p 33. (A new Reagan Administration SECNAV takes over. His first publicly reported statements on the Maritime Strategy).

** Korb, Lawrence J., "A Blueprint for Defense Spending", Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1987, p 34. ("The Navy's proper wartime job is...to secure the sea lanes necessary to support a ground campaign and to take the Soviet Navy out of the war, not primarily by seeking it out and destroying it, but by bottling it up. For this, a 12-carrier Navy should suffice").

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** Cushman, John H., Jr., "A Dialogue: What Kind of Navy Does the U.S. Need?", New York Times, May 31, 1987, p 4-3. (VADM Joseph Metcalf III vs. Dr. William W. Kaufmann on the Maritime Strategy and other naval issues).

* Webb, Jamew H., Jr., "The Aircraft Carrier: Centerpiece of Maritime Strategy", Wings of Gold, Summer 1987, pp S-2 & S-3. (The new Secretary of the Navy on the national military strategy, the Maritime Strategy, and the role of the carrier. Continuity of the Reagan-Weinberger-Lehman view of maritime strategy confirmed).

** Barnett, CAPT Roger W., USN (Ret), "The Maritime Continental Debate Isn't Over", Proceedings, June 1987, pp 28-34. (Still more on the two famous alleged "mindsets", by one of the most prominent crafters of the Maritime Strategy). Also, see "Comment and Discussion", August 1987, p 30).

** George, LT James L., USN (Ret), "INNF", Proceedings, June 1987, pp 35-39. (A Center for Naval Analyses staffer on the effect on the Navy and its Maritime Strategy should European Intermediate Nuclear Force arms control be achieved).

** Stefanick, Tom, "The U.S. Navy: Directions for the Future", F.A.S. Public Interest Report, June 1987, pp 1+. (Mostly about the budget, but some discussion of the Maritime Strategy, most elements of which the author opposes).

** "The Navy Sails on Rough Seas", Newsweek, June 1, 1987, pp 23-26. (A summary of the arguments, pro and con, as influenced by reactions to the Iraqi attack on the U.S.S. Stark in the Persian Gulf).

* "Lehman on Sea Power", U.S. News and World Report, June 15, 1987, p 28 ("The maritime strategy I've promoted is not new; it is NATO strategy that was never taken seriously -- a formula for holding Norway and the Eastern Mediterranean, two high-threat areas"). See also related articles, pp 36-43.

* "Trost Wants Flexibility in U.S. Thinking, Assessment of Soviets", Aerospace Daily, June 22, 1987, p 462; and "Naval Strategy Must Change Says Adm Trost", Jane's Defence Weekly, June 27, 1987, p 1345. (The Chief of Naval Operations warns against rigid assumptions about Soviet naval options).

Rostow, Eugene V., "For the Record", Washington Post, June 30, 1987, p A18. (Extract from a Naval War College lecture by a former high Reagan Administration Arms Control official: "I can imagine no better antidote for the frustration and irritability which now characterize allied relationships than allied cooperation in mounting successful applications of counter-force at outposts of the Soviet empire and shifting geographical points around its periphery. The Soviet empire is extremely vulnerable to such a peninsular strategy").

* "Interview: James A. Lyons, Jr., Admiral, U.S. Navy", Proceedings, July 1987, p 67. (CINCPACFLT on the importance of the Pacific in the Maritime Strategy, despite media focus on Euro-Central Atlantic theater considerations).

* Hernandez, VADM D.E., "The New Third Fleet", Proceedings, July 1987, pp 73-76. (Commander Third Fleet on the revitalization of his organization to implement its share of the load in carrying out the Maritime Strategy).

** Nelson, CDR William H., "Peacekeeper at Risk", Proceedings, July 1987, pp 90-97. (On applying the Maritime Strategy to the Persian Gulf region).

** Peppe, Lt P. Kevin, "Acoustic Showdown for the SSNs", Proceedings, July 1987, pp 33-37. (On the effects of "acoustic parity" on the Maritime Strategy. He makes similar points in the July 1987 Submarine Review)

** Winnefeld, LT James A., Jr., "Fresh Claws for the Tomcat", Proceedings, July 1987, pp 103-107. (On the relationship between the Maritime Strategy, CVBG operations, and hardware requirements. "The F-14D is not just another nice fighter; it offers a significant enhancement of the CVBG's ability to execute the maritime strategy. The aircraft's true worth is apparant only in this light").

** Newell, LTC Clayton R., USA, "Structuring Our Forces for the Big Battle", Armed Forces Journal International, July 1987, p 6. (Takes on both the U.S. Navy's "vaunted maritime strategy" and the U.S. Army's "large complex corps designed to fight the Soviets in Western Europe." Prefers force structures and strategies enabling the United States to "apply its military power sparingly in small well-focused engagements in unexpected parts of the world.").

** Prisley, Jack, "Submarine Aggressor Squadron -- Its Time has Come", Submarine Review, July 1987, pp 83-86. (A call for a "Top Fish" program, to enable submariners to better practice what they must do to implement the Maritime Strategy).

** Wilson, George, "Soviets Score Silent Success in Undersea Race with U.S.", Washington Post, July 17, 1987, p A20. (Claims ADM Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "has never been enamored of the forward strategy" and that "other Defense Department officials said the forward strategy started to sink as soon as Lehman left the Pentagon." On the former, see Crowe testimony earlier in 1987, cited above. On the latter, see Mark Twain's cable from London to the Associated Press, 1897).

** Truver, Scott, "Phibstrike 95 - Fact or Fiction?", Armed Forces Journal International, August 1987, pp 102-108. (A case study of how the Maritime Strategy has been used as a framework by the Marine Corps to develop an amphibious warfare concept of future operations).

** Kalb, CDR Richard, "The Maritime Strategy and our European Allies: Cold Feet on the Northern Flank?", Proceedings (forthcoming). (By a former member of the OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) and contributor to the development of the Maritime Strategy).

** Cimbala, Stephen J., Extended Deterrence: The U.S. and NATO Europe, Lexington MA: Lexington Books (forthcoming in 1987). (Has a thoughtful chapter on the Maritime Strategy and the Defense of Europe).

** Gray, Colin, The Wartime Influence of Seapower on Landpower: An Historical Analysis, (forthcoming in 1987).

** Friedman, Norman, The Maritime Strategy of the U.S. Navy: Concepts and Operations, London: Jane's Publishing Co. (forthcoming in 1987).

** Daniel, Donald and Wood, Robert, Presuppositions of the Maritime Strategy, Elmsford NY: Pergamon-Brassey's (forthcoming in 1987). (By two Naval War College faculty members).

** Barnett, CAPT Roger, USN (Ret.), Bernstein, Alvin, and Gray, Colin (eds.), Maritime Strategy: A Textbook (forthcoming in 1987). (Collaboration by a former pre-eminent U.S.Navy strategist, a Naval War College Strategy Department head and a distinguished civilian strategic thinker).

** Glaser, Charles L. and Miller, Steven E. (eds.), The Navy, the Maritime Strategy, and Nuclear War (forthcoming in 1988). (Examines whether the strategy might cause escalation and the results if it did).

** Ullman, CDR Harlan K., USN (Ret.), U.S. Military Strategy for an Uncertain Future (forthcoming in 1988).

** Hartmann, Frederick, A Force for Peace: The U.S. Navy, 1982-1986, (forthcoming in 1988). (By a Naval War College faculty member).

** Baer, George W., Manila Bay to the Norwegian Sea: Dimensions of U.S. Naval Strategy Since 1890 (forthcoming in 1988). (By a Naval War College faculty member).

IV. SISTER SERVICE CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND VIEWS ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY

The Maritime Strategy fully incorporates U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Air Force and Army contributions to the global maritime campaign. In fact, the case can be made that more thought has been given to actual joint combat operations (as opposed to problems of command relationships or lift) by the Navy and Marine Corps in codifying the Maritime Strategy than by either the Air Force or the Army in developing their own "cornerstone" publications. The open literature on potential Army contributions to maritime warfare -- such as air defense batteries based in islands and littoral areas -- is particularly weak.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub. 2), Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1986. (Reflecting the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Title 10 and Title 32 U.S. Code, as amended, and DOD Directive 5100.1 (The "Functions Paper"), JCS Pub. 2. governs the joint activities of the U.S. armed forces. See especially Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2-3, charging each Military Department, including the Navy, to "prepare forces ... for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war". This responsibility (and not --as some critics charge--a desire to somehow usurp the authority of the JCS or the Unified and Specified Commanders) was the primary impetus and justification for Navy and Marine Corps development, promulgation, and discussion of the Maritime Strategy. It is the Navy Department's framework for discharging its responsibilities to "organize, train, equip and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea").

U.S. Army, Operations (FM 100-5), Washington: Department of the Army, 20 August 1982. (The Army's "keystone warfighting manual" and therefore a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Almost no discussion of Army-Navy mutual support, however, e.g.: air defence and island/littoral reinforcement. Included on p 17-7 a useful discussion of the importance and essentially maritime nature of the NATO northern and southern European regions. Superseded in May 1986; distribution now restricted to U.S. government agencies).

U.S. Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force (AFM 1-1), Washington: Department of the Air Force, 16 March 1984. (The "cornerstone" Air Force doctrinal manual and therefore a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Takes a somewhat narrower view of potential areas of mutual support than does the Navy. See especially the discussion of objectives of naval forces on p 1-3, neglecting projection operations, e.g. strike or amphibious warfare; and pp 2-15, 3-1, and 3-5/3-6, covering possible Air Force actions to enhance naval operations, virtually all of which are incorporated in the Maritime Strategy. Note, however, the lack of mention of any concomitant naval role in enhancing "aerospace " operations, and the lack of discussion of USAF AAW contributions to maritime warfare, a key element of the Maritime Strategy).

Cooper, Bert H., Maritime Roles for Land-Based Aviation Report No. 83-151F), Washington: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, August 1, 1983. (Analyzes recent classified studies, identifies problems and issues, and discusses recent USN-USAF initiatives).

Wilkerson, LTCOL Thomas, USMC, "Two if By Sea," Proceedings, November 1983, pp. 34-39. (On important role of the U.S. Air Force in Maritime Strategy by the principal Marine Corps contributor to the Strategy's development.)

Lewis, Kevin N., Combined Operations in Modern Naval Warfare: Maritime Strategy and Interservice Cooperation (Rand Paper #6999), Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation, April 1984. (See especially for arguments on alleged unique "Navy Planning Style", many of which are belied by the Maritime Strategy).

Killebrew, LTC Robert B., USA, Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options, Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 1986. (Unique among studies of NATO defense in its attempt at an integrated discussion of U.S. and allied land, sea, and air forces. Argues NATO conventional defense is possible. Advocates early employment of naval forces as a defensive barrier "guarding" force. Sees a potential role for carrier air on the Central Front in a protracted war).

Atkeson, MG Edward, USA (Ret.), "Arctic Could Be a Hot Spot in Future Conflicts", Army, January 1986, pp 13-14. (Fanciful proposal for expanded U.S. Army role in helping implement the Maritime Strategy: "An Army air cavalry force, properly tailored for the mission, should be able to locate submarine activity under the ice as well as, if not better than, another submarine").

Alberts, COL D. J., USAF, "U.S. Naval Air and Deep Strike", Naval Forces, No 1/1986, pp 62-75. (The strike warfare elements of the Maritime Strategy from an Air Force officer's point of view).

** Harned, MAJ Glenn, USA, "Comment and Discussion: The Maritime Strategy", Proceedings, February 1986, pp 26-28. (Argues U.S. Army suffers from lack of a Maritime Strategy equivalent and from Navy reticence in explaining its operational and tactical doctrines).

* Pendley, RADM William, "The U.S. Navy, Forward Defense, and the Air-Land Battle", in Pfaltzgraff, Robert, Jr. et al. (eds.), Emerging Doctrines and Technologies, Lexington MA: Lexington Books, forthcoming in 1987. (Official views of the Navy's Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60) as of April 1986. Argues that Maritime Strategy and Air-Land Battle doctrine are similar and complementary. Sees both as essential parts -- along with nuclear deterrence -- of an "essential triad" of U.S. defense strategy. A short summary is on pp 15-16 of Emerging Doctrines and Technologies: Implications for Global and Regional Political-Military Balance: A Conference Report: April 16-18, 1986, Cambridge MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1986. Cf Dunn and Staudenmaier May-June 1985 Survival article; March-April 1986 views of VADM Mustin on linkage between the Maritime Strategy and "Deep Strike", cited above; and West German government official views on lack of linkage, cited in Section V below).

** Kennedy, COL William V., USAR (Ret.), "There Goes the U.S. Navy--Steaming the Wrong Way", Christian Science Monitor, 23 June 1986, p 14. Calls for the Navy to refocus on Asia, crediting a U.S. Army "counterattack" with having turned the Maritime Strategy from an alleged early Pacific orientation to a current European one. Attempts to drive a wedge between the Navy and Marine Corps, and alleges "only nominal mention of the Army and the Air Force" in the Proceedings "Maritime Strategy" Supplement, charges belied by actually reading the Supplement).

** Grace, LCDR James A., "JTC^{3}A and the Maritime Strategy", Surface Warfare, July/August 1986, pp 22-24. (On the role of the Joint Tactical C^3 Agency in fielding joint and allied programs and procedures to ensure implementation of the Maritime Strategy).

Yost, ADM Paul, USCG, "The Bright Slash of Liberty: Today's Coast Guard: Buffeted But Unbowed", Sea Power, August 1986, pp 8-24. (See especially pp 11-12 and 21-22, on the Maritime Defense Zones, an important Navy-Coast Guard element of the Maritime Strategy, by the Commandant of the Coast Guard).

** Builder, Carl H., The Army in the Strategic Planning Process: Who Shall Bell the Cat?, Bethesda MD: U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, October 1986. (A study done for the U.S. Army to "try to find out why the Army doesn't seem to do very well in the strategic planning process". Analyzes Army, Navy, and Air Force strategic planning, especially the Maritime Strategy. Looks for -- and therefore "finds" -- differences rather than similarities. To be revised and reissued as a Rand Corporation publication in 1987).

Prina, L. Edgar, "The Tripartite Ocean: The Air Force and Coast Guard Give the Navy a Helping Hand", Sea Power, October 1986, pp 32-45. (Good update on tri-service contributions to implementing the Maritime Strategy).

** Fraser, Ronald, "MDZ Mission Defines Coast Guard Wartime Role", Navy Times, October 20, 1986, p 27. (On the role of the Maritime Defense Zones).

** Breemer, Jan S. and Hoover, SSG Todd, USAF, "SAC Goes to Sea with Harpoon", National Defence, February 1987, pp 41-45. (A history and an update). Cf Chipman and Lay article cited in Section XI below.

Ley, CAPT Michael USA, "Navy Badly Needs to Beef Up Land Operations Fire Support", Army, May 1987, pp 12+. (Argues for more large-caliber naval guns to support Army operations ashore).

** Chipman, Dr. Donald D., "Rethinking Forward Strategy and the Distant Blockade", Armed Forces Journal International, August 1987, pp 82-88. (Argues for joint integrated USN-USAF wartime operations in NATO's Northern Region, the GUIK gap, and the Norwegian Sea. Well in keeping with the Maritime Strategy).

** Estep, COL James L., USA, "Army's Role in Joint Global Military Strategy", Army, August 1987, pp 11+. (Decries "lack of a more global, jointly oriented strategy" by the U.S. Army and applauds the Navy's development of same).

V. ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND VIEWS ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY

The Maritime Strategy as developed by the U.S. Navy of the 1980s is heavily oriented toward combined (and joint) operations, and this was reflected in the Proceedings January 1986 Supplement, "The Maritime Strategy". The postwar U.S. Navy had never been "unilateralist". Allied contributions to the global campaign were worked out years ago and then had been continually updated in the drafting of allied war plans, Memoranda of Agreement, and other documents. They have been routinely discussed at annual Navy-to-Navy staff policy talks and CNO-to-CNO visits, held between the U.S. Navy and each of its most important allied associates. Thus most of the hard bargaining and tradeoffs had already been done, and integrating allied efforts with the U.S. Navy component of the Maritime Strategy was not particularly difficult. Once the Maritime Strategy was drafted, it was briefed to key allied CNOs and planning staffs and to NATO commanders. Allied feedback was considered and utilized in updating revisions to the Strategy, and the process continues today.

Allied naval strategy -- and its relationship to the Maritime Strategy -- is well enough documented. The NATO Information Service is prolific, and NATO commanders author relevant articles frequently. Most allied defense ministries publish occasional or annual "Defense Reports" and/or "White Papers" which sometimes touch on naval strategy as well as policy and procurement issues. As is evident from these and other writings, U.S. Navy and allied military thought is generally congruent.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures (10th and subsequent editions), Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1981 and subsequently. (The basic official public document on NATO policy and strategy. See especially latest (1984) edition, pp 108-111, 143-144 and 380. "The primary task in wartime of the Allied Command Atlantic would be to ensure security in the whole Atlantic area by guarding the sea lanes and denying their use to an enemy, to conduct conventional and nuclear operations against enemy naval bases and airfields and to support operations carried out by SACEUR." "NATO's forces (have) roles of neutralizing Soviet strategic nuclear submarines, safeguarding transatlantic sea lines, and in general preventing the Warsaw Pact from gaining maritime supremacy in the North Atlantic").

Train, ADM Harry, "U.S. Maritime Power", in Coker, Christopher, U.S. Military Power in the 1980s, London: MacMillan Press, 1983 PP 107-114. (SACLANT provides details on the 1981 NATO Maritime Concept of Operations (CONMAROPS), one of the building blocks of the Maritime Strategy).

Wemyss, RADM Martin LaT., RN, "Naval Exercises 1980-81", Jane's Naval Annual, 1981, pp 151-158. (Highlights problems in interallied naval cooperation resulting from U.S. Navy communication and intelligence systems advances).

Wemyss, RADM Martin LaT., RN, "Submarines and Anti-submarine Operations for the Uninitiated," RUSI Journal, September 1981, pp. 22-27. (Restatement of classic Royal Navy arguments for focusing allied ASW efforts around expected afloat targets, instead of US Navy-spearheaded forward operations.)

The North Atlantic Assembly, NATO Anti Submarine Warfare: Strategy, Requirements and the Need for Cooperation, Brussels: 1982. (Good survey of the issues, with a call for resolution of the debate over mission priorities).

Hackett, GEN Sir John, BA (Ret.), McGeoch, VADM Sir Ian, RN, (Ret.), et al, The Third World War: The Untold Story, New York: MacMillan, 1982. (Fiction. Sequel to The Third World War: August 1985 (1978). A British vision, stressing the war at sea and on the northern front, and all but ignoring the Mediterranean and Pacific. "Swing" and carrier strikes on the Kola understood--as in 1978--as normal NATO modus operandi. Cf Clancy's 1986 Red Storm Rising, and Hayes et al.'s American Lake, Chapter 19, cited in Section II above).

Tonge, David, "Exposure Troubles NATO's Northern Commanders", Financial Times, October 27, 1982, p 3. (Reports NATO Northern Region ground commanders' concerns that carrier battle groups may not arrive in the Norwegian Sea early enough).

Eberle, ADM Sir James, RN, "Defending the Atlantic Connection", in Till, Geoffrey, (ed.), The Future of British Sea Power, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984, pp 146-150. (See especially for frank overview of four Royal Navy tasks in the Atlantic).

British Atlantic Committee, Diminishing the Nuclear Threat: NATO's Defense and New Technology, London: February 1984. (A group of retired British generals and others rail against the "practicality" and "very purpose" of the NATO reinforcement mission, given their assumptions of a short conventional war phase in Europe and overwhelming surface ship vulnerability. See also Mitchell, LT I.G., RN., "Atlantic Reinforcement -- A Re-emerging Debate", Armed Forces, September 1986, pp 399-400.

Hunter, Robert, (ed.), NATO--The Next Generation, Boulder CO: Westview, 1984. (See especially--and unexpectedly--for Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force role in closing off Far Eastern straits and protecting Western Pacific sea lines of communication, in chapters by Jun Tsunoda and Shunji Taoka).

Bouchard, LT Joseph, and Hess, LT Douglas, "The Japanese Navy and Sea-Lanes Defense", Proceedings, March 1984, PP 88-97. (On the concurrent Japanese Maritime Strategy debate. See also Lehrack, LTCOL Otto, "Search for a New Consensus", same issue, pp 96-99).

Toyka, CDR Viktor, FGN, "A Submerged Forward Defense," Proceedings, March 1984, pp. 145-147. (Complementary German Maritime Strategy for the Baltic.)

King-Harman, COL Anthony, BA, "NATO Strategy--A New Look", RUSI, March 1984, pp 26-29. (By a former long-time member of the International NATO Staff. Alleges and decries a NATO "lack of political direction in the maritime sphere". "It has been largely left to SACLANT himself to develop and implement a maritime strategy for deterrence... There is also a Tri-MNC concept of operations again carrying no political endorsement." Calls for a new NATO "strategic review", one result of which, he anticipates would be a finding that "reinforcements...would only need the minimum of maritime protection").

Mabesoone, CAPT W. C., RNLN, and Buis, CDR N. W. G., RNLN, "Maritime Strategic Aspects of the North Sea", RUSI, September 1984, pp 12-17. (Dutch Navy view of North Sea operations. Complements the Maritime Strategy. Stresses need for land-based air forces in air defense and possibility of SSN TLAM-C support of Central Front operations. Emphasis on barrier vice close-support Naval Protection of Shipping operations).

Federal Minister of Defence (Federal Republic of Germany), White Paper 1985: The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces. (Includes latest official West German defense policy and strategy views. See especially pp 27-29, 76-77, 111, and 211-216. Declares unequivocal German support for "forward defense at sea" in accordance with the NATO commanders' maritime concept of operations, which "calls for countering the threat far from friendly sea routes and shores. Interdiction of enemy naval forces should be effected immediately in front of their own bases". Differentiates clearly, however, between such use of naval (and air) forces and "aggressive forward defense by ground operations in the opponent's territory", which "NATO strategy rules out").

Holst, Johan Jorgen, et al. (eds.), Deterrence and Defense in the North, Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985. (See especially authoritative chapters by high Norwegian government officials and Hunt, Kenneth, "The Security of the Center and the North", pp. 66-76: "The Stronger the North, the Stronger the Center").

Caufriez, Chaplain G., "Comment and Discussion: Plan Orange Revisited", Proceedings, March 1985, pp 73 & 79. (From Home Forces Headquarters, Belgium, a plea for Norwegian Sea vice GIUK Gap defense, lest "at one go, the northern flank would have crumbled").

Stavridis, CDR James, "The Global Maritime Coalition," Proceedings, April 1985, pp. 58-74. Also "Comment and Discussion," October 1985, p. 177. (On role of allies in Maritime Strategy, by a former OP-603 staffer.)

Grove, Eric J., "The Convoy Debate," Naval Forces, No. III/1985, pp. 38-46. (Update of classic post-war Royal Navy pro-convoy/anti-forward ops arguments, by a leading British civilian naval analyst.)

"Royal Navy Edges Closer to Kola", Defence Attache, 4/1985, pp 9-10. (On actual complementary contemporary Royal Navy North Norwegian Sea strategy).

Shadwick, Martin, "Canada's Commitments to NATO: The Need for Rationalization", Canadian Defense Quarterly, Summer 1985, pp 22-27. (The range of options for future Canadian deployment strategies, any of which would affect the Maritime Strategy).

Crickard, RADM F. W., CN, "Three Oceans--Three Challenges: The Future of Canada's Maritime Forces", Naval Forces, V/1985, pp 13-27. (On complementary Canadian strategy, especially area ASW in the North Atlantic SLOC).

** Heginbotham, Stanley, "The Forward Maritime Strategy and Nordic Europe", Naval War College Review, November-December 1985, pp. 19-27.

Dunn, Michael Collins, "Canada Rethinks Its Defense Posture", Defense and Foreign Affairs, November 1985, pp 12-19. (Discusses Canadian ground and air contributions to NATO's Northern Front and naval contribution to Atlantic ASW and Arctic defense).

Sokolsky, Joel J. "Canada's Maritime Forces: Strategic Assumptions, Commitments, Priorities", Canadian Defence Quarterly, Winter 85/86, pp 24-30. (By a leading Canadian civilian defense and naval specialist. See especially pp 28-29, regarding similarities between the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s and NATO naval strategy of the 1950s. Also see Francis, David R., "Canada Ponders Major Shift in Defense Policy", Christian Science Monitor, February 4, 1987, p 9, for update of Sokolsky's views).

Cole, Paul M. and Hart, Douglas M. (eds.), Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990s, Boulder CO: Westview, 1986. (See especially COL Jonathan Alford, BA (Ret.), "The Soviet Naval Challenge", pp 43-56, and LTGEN Heinz von zur Gathen, FRGA (Ret.), "The Federal Republic of Germany's Contribution to the Defense of Northern Europe", pp 57-82. The former sees forward U.S. operations in the Norwegian Sea as unlikely, and argues that the Royal Navy should therefore concentrate on the Channel, the North Sea, and the Norwegian Sea, rather than either "unspecific flexibility" or "keeping open the sea lines of communication to the United States", options that parallel those discussed in the concurrent U.S. Maritime Strategy debates. The latter discusses the increasing West German role in Baltic, North, and Norwegian Sea defense. Both authors base their arguments for enhanced European naval power on the premise that the U.S. Navy will not be available, at least not in strength, in the Norwegian Sea early in a war).

Dibb, Paul, Review of Australia's Defense Capabilities, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986. (Against Australian involvement with United States and other allied contingency planning for global war. Claims that Radford-Collins Agreement "convoying and escort connotations which extend more than 2000 nautical miles west of Australia to the mid-Indian Ocean suggest a disproportionate commitment of scarce resources to activities which may be only marginally related to our national interest and capabilities". An input to the March 1987 government White Paper on defense).

Riste, Olav and Tamnes, Rolf, The Soviet Naval Threat and Norway, Oslo: Research Center for Defense History (FHFS), National Defense College Norway, 1986. (See especially pp 18-22. Two Norwegian defense specialists see recent U.S. naval and other efforts as providing "from the Norwegian point of view... a considerably improved probability that the supply lines to Norway will be kept open"). See also Tamnes' "Integration and Screening", (also FHFS 1986), on Norwegian attitudes in the 1970s and 1980s.

Richey, George, Britain's Strategic Role in NATO, London: MacMillan, 1986. (Argues for Britain's return to a classic Maritime Strategy, as Ambassador Robert Komer, Senator Gary Hart and William Lind -- but not the U.S. Navy -- use the term).

Price, Alfred, Air Battle Central Europe, New York: The Free Press, 1986. (See Chapter 14, "Guardians of the Baltic Shore", on Federal German Naval Aviation forward air-to-surface warfare concepts in the Baltic, and Chapter 15, "Protecting the Lifeline", on air defense of the seas surrounding the United Kingdom).

Okazuki, Hisahiko, Japan's National Security Strategy, Maryland: Abt Books, 1986. (Ambassador Okazuki presents persuasive arguments why Japan could not stay out of large or small conflicts involving its interests).

Small, ADM William N., "The Southern Region: The Key to Europe's Defense", Armed Forces, January 1986, pp 12-13. (By the NATO Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe/Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe. NATO's plans for defense of its Southern Region, including allied and U.S. Navy Sixth Fleet/STRIKFORSOUTH Mediterranean operations and Turkish Black Sea operations).

Bjarnason, Bjorn, "Iceland and NATO", NATO Review, February 1986, pp 7-12. (By one of Iceland's leading journalists. "It is crucial that in any defence of sea routes between North America and Western Europe, ...the Soviet fleet is confined as far north towards its home base at the Kola Peninsula as possible...the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap...is not an adequate barrier; instead, NATO envisages a forward defence in the Norwegian Sea." Includes update on the defense debate in Iceland).

Stryker, Russell F., "Civil Shipping Support for NATO", NATO Review, February 1986, pp 29-33. (By a U.S. Maritime Administration official and member of the NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping. On the shipping that is to use the North Atlantic SLOC).

Margolis, Eric, "Will Canadian Waters Become the Next Maginot Line?", Wall Street Journal, February 21, 1986, p 23. (A Canadian call for increased U.S.-Canadian ASW capabilities in the Arctic).

Schlim, VADM A. J. P., BN, "Mine Warfare in European Waters", NATO's Sixteen Nations, February-March 1986, pp 20-28. (By the Belgian CNO. How NATO plans to use mines and mining against the Soviets. Excellent complementarity with the Maritime Strategy).

Leenhardt, ADM Yves, FN, "France--The Need For a Balanced Navy", NATO's Sixteen Nations, February-March 1986, pp 41-46. (Rowing to the beat of a different drum. Authoritative statement by the French CNO. Heavy emphasis on nuclear deterrence, crisis prevention and control, and allied cooperation. Minimal discussion relating to global or regional forward conventional operations against the Soviets, however, in contrast to U.S. Maritime Strategy and other allied writers).

Young, Thomas-Durell, "Australia Bites Off More than the RAN Can Chew", Pacific Defence Reporter, March 1986, pp 15-17. See also his "'Self-Reliance' and Force Development in the RAN", Proceedings, March 1986, pp 157-161, and "Don't Abandon Radford-Collins", Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1986, p 16. (On Australian and New Zealand ASW and Naval Control/Protection of Shipping roles in the Indian and Southwest Pacific oceans).

Kampe, VADM Helmut, FGN, "Defending the Baltic Approaches", Proceedings, March 1986, pp 88-93. (By the NATO Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Baltic Approaches. Complementary German and Danish naval strategies: "In the Baltic Sea, forward defense begins at the Warsaw Pact ports").

Grove, Eric J., "After the Falklands", Proceedings, March 1986, pp 121-129. (Questions the wisdom of the Royal Navy functioning primarily in conjunction with Striking Fleet Atlantic and USN SSNs in the Norwegian Sea. Would prefer RN focus to return to Naval Control and Protection of Shipping in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel).

Grimstvedt, RADM Bjarne, RNN, "Norwegian Maritime Operations", Proceedings, March 1986, pp 144-149. (By the Norwegian CNO. Stresses Norwegian Navy intent and capabilities to defend North Norway, including same Vestfjorden area that focused COMSECONDFLT/COMSTRIKFLTLANT's attention in 1985 and 1986).

Secretary of State for Defence (UK), Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986: 1, London: HMSO, 1986. (See especially pp 29, 34, and 60-61. ("...enemy attack submarines are successfully to be held at arm's length from the critical Atlantic routes. Defence against these submarines would begin when they sailed"; "the availability of U.S. ships in the Eastern Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities cannot be assumed"; "U.S. and European navies are continuing...to ensure the preservation of an essential margin of allied maritime superiority in key ocean areas").

Defense Agency (Japan), Defense of Japan: 1986. (Includes latest official Japanese defense policy and strategy views. See especially pp 99 and 154. Outlines agreed division of labor between the Maritime Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Navy in the event of an attack on Japan, as understood by the Japanese government. The Maritime Strategy was developed in full accordance with these concepts).

Greenwood, David, "Towards Role Specialization in NATO", NATO's Sixteen Nations, July 1986, pp 44-49. (Argues against a significant Eastern Atlantic naval role for Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Denmark. This translates out as largely an attack on the existence of the Dutch Navy, one of the world's best).

Armitage, Richard, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance", Defense/86, July-August 1986, pp 20-27. (Reagan Administration defense policy vis-a-vis Japan, by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The context of the Maritime Strategy in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific. See also his "Japan's Defense Program: 'No Cause for Alarm'", Washington Post, February 18, 1987, p A18).

** Eberle, ADM Sir James, RN, "Editorial", Naval Forces, IV/1986, p 7. (By a former top Royal Navy and NATO Commander-in-Chief. "The New Maritime Strategy is to be welcomed as a brave effort to bring some much needed clarity into the field of maritime strategic thinking. But it is more likely to be welcomed in Europe by naval officers than it is by political leaders").

Tokinoya, Atsushi, The Japan-U.S. Alliance: A Japanese Perspective (Adelphi Paper #212), London: IISS, Autumn 1986.

** Huitfeldt, LTGEN Tonne, RNA, NATO's Northern Security, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, September 1976. (By the retired Director of the NATO International Military Staff. "United States maritime strategy is in harmony with the agreed NATO strategy". Good coverage of the 1981 NATO Concept of Maritime Operations, a major building block of the Maritime Strategy).

Howlett, GEN Geoffrey, BA., "Interview", Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, September 1986, pp 13-16, (NATO Commander-in Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe rejects a GIUK Gap maritime defense line. Advocates forward defense on land and sea in North Norway and the Baltic, and containment of the Soviet Northern and Baltic fleets in their home waters).

** Grove, Eric, "The Maritime Strategy", Bulletin of the Council for Arms Control (UK), September 1986, pp 5-6. (Regards the Strategy as "self-consciously offensive" and "self-consciously coalition-minded", "yet another example of the growing difference in mood between the two sides of the Atlantic". Challenges fellow Europeans to inject amendments reflecting their own "interests and fears". The "difference in mood" he sees, however, may well be more between military leaders and some political writers on both sides of the ocean than between Americans and Europeans).

** Ausland, John C., "The Heavy Traffic in Northern Seas", International Herald Tribune, 16 September 1986. (On some effects of the Maritime Strategy in Norway).

** Huitfeldt, LTGEN Tonne, RNA, "The Threat From the North -- Defense of Scandinavia", NATO's Sixteen Nations, October 1986, pp 26-32. (The former NATO International Military Staff Director's endorsement of the Maritime Strategy as "making a more effective contribution to deterring the Soviet Northern Fleet from any adventurism in the Norwegian Sea, and Soviet aggression in general", with the caution that it "not go beyond what is essential for deterrence and defense").

** Boerresen, CAPT Jacob, RNN, "Norway and the U.S. Maritime Strategy", Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 14-15. (By the military secretary to the Norwegian Minister of Defence. ("During the 1970s, NATO and the USA expressly limited their carrier operations...to the waters in and south of the GIUK gap, Norway...found this situation rather uncomfortable... The official Norwegian reaction to (forward deployment of CVBGs) has been positive, (but) Norway is...sensitive to all developments that it fears may threaten the low level of tension").

"Japan, U.S. Map Out Sea Defenses", Washington Times, 1 December 1986, p 6. (On the wartime division of labor between the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force).

Cremasco, Maurizio, "Italy: A New Definition of Security?", in Kelleher, Catherine M. and Mattox, Gale A. (eds.), Evolving European Defense Policies, Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1987, pp 257-272. (On the Italian military policy debate and Italian Navy views on strategy).

Gann, L.H. (ed.), The Defense of Western Europe, London: Croom Helm, 1987. (Surveys all the defense forces of all the Western European nations. Particularly useful is Nigel de Lee's "The Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces", pp 58-94, which examines in some detail their wartime sea and air concepts of operations in the Norwegian Sea, the Baltic approaches, the Baltic itself and inshore waters. These concepts are well integrated into the Maritime Strategy. As regards Denmark, de Lee notes: "Plans for naval action are based on aggressive tactics in depth, and this entails a forward defence". Particularly useless is the highly parochial chapter by COL Harry Summers USA (Ret.), allegedly on "United States Armed Forces in Europe", which should have been styled "The U.S. Army in Germany").

Secretary of State for Defence (UK), Statement on the Defence Estimates 1987: 1, London: HMSO, 1987. (See especially p 25 for reaffirmation of previous year's policy statements and commitment to Royal Navy "forward deployment operations in the Norwegian Sea").

** Nakanishi, Terumasa, "U.S. Nuclear Policy and Japan", Washington Quarterly, Winter 1987, pp 81-97, especially pp 84-85 and p 90. (The Maritime Strategy in the context of the overall military situation in Northeast Asia. "The new 'Full-Forward' strategy of the U.S. Pacific Fleet ... is certainly in the interest of Japan's conventional security". He is less sanguine regarding Japan's nuclear security, however).

Newman, Peter C., "Business Watch: About-face in Defense Strategy", Maclean's Magazine, 12 January 1987, p 28. (Naval aspects of the defense debate in Canada on the eve of publication of the 1987 "White Paper").

Ebata, Kensuke, "Ocean Air Defense Japanese Style", Proceedings, March 1987, pp 98-101. (On Japanese AAW concepts and programs, essential elements of the Maritime Strategy in the Pacific).

** Till, Geoffrey, "Maritime Power: The European Dimension", Naval Forces, II/1987, pp 88-104. (Excellent and comprehensive survey by a European of how European naval power complements the Maritime Strategy in supporting overall NATO Maritime Strategy. A partial antidote to Bing West's concerns).

Auer, CDR James, USN (Ret) and Seno, CDR Sadao, JMSDF (Ret), "Japan's Maritime Self-Defence Force", Naval Forces, II/1987, pp 178-190. (Stress on the division of labor between the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force in the Northwest Pacific, and on the deterrent value of same).

** Crickard, RADM Frederick, "The Canadian Navy - New Directions", Naval Forces, II/1987, pp 78-87. (Sees the Maritime Strategy as forcing hard choices on Canadian naval planners. Cf his views of a year earlier, cited above).

Longbottom, Squadron Leader S.P., RAAF, "Maritime Strike Strategy for the Royal Australian Air Force", Defense Force Journal, March/April 1987, pp 5+. (Argues for increased RAAF attention to mine warfare).

Department of Defence (Australia), The Defence of Australia: 1987, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, March 19, 1987. (The first official Australian Defense "White Paper" since 1976 ensures continued RAN cooperation within the Maritime Strategy. "In the remote contingency of global conflict...our responsibilities would include those associated with the Radford-Collins Agreement for the protection and control of shipping. Subject to priority requirement in our own area the Australian Government would then consider contributions further afield...for example, our FFGs...are capable of effective participation in a U.S. carrier battle group well distant from Australia's shores").

** Sokolsky, Joel, "The U.S. Navy and Canadian Security: Trends In American Maritime Strategy", Peace and Security, Spring 1987, pp 10+. (Sees the Maritime Strategy as creating problems for Canada. Advocates a Canadian naval build up).

** Mackay, CDR S.V., RN, "An Allied Reaction" Proceedings, April 1987, pp 82-89. (Concludes that a peacetime USN Norwegian Sea CVBG presence is required with concomitant "greater commitment from Norway", and "a firm and agreed-upon line...on ROEs". "There are clear indications from recent exercises that this Maritime Strategy is the way ahead for U.S. maritime forces and not solely to support the cause for a 600-ship Navy...the supporting maritime nations in NATO must follow the lead. (But) We in Europe must be sure that the Maritime Strategy is a genuine US. policy for the future and not just a product of the current administration"). See also "Comment and Discussion", July 1987. pp 19-20.

** Urban, Mark, "New Navy Plan to Attack Soviet Subs Near Bases", The Independent (London), April 14, 1987. (Commander-in-Chief of the British Fleet, ADM Hunt, on forward Royal Navy and NATO submarine--including anti-SSBN--operations).

Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987. (June 1987 official Canadian Ministry of Defense "White Paper", the first since 1971. Current Canadian contributions to allied Maritime Strategy and future plans. See especially maps pp 13, 52, 64 and discussion of proposed changes in Canadian policy, which will increase the requirements for USN and USMC forces in the Norwegian Sea and elsewhere, but which should help improve other elements needed to carry out the Strategy).

Nishihara, Masashi, "Maritime Cooperation in the Pacific: The United States and its Partners", Naval War College Review, Summer 1987, pp 37-41. ("The U.S. strategy of horizontal escalation by which the United States would open up armed tensions in different parts of the world, in order to force the Soviets to disperse their forces, may not meet Japanese interests").

** Arkin, William M. and Shallhorn, Steve, "Canada Even More Under U.S. Thumb in Sub Plan", Globe and Mail (Toronto), July 17, 1987, p 7. (Decries the Maritime Strategy, the new Canadian defense policy, and the linkage between the two).

VI. SOVIET STRATEGY AND VIEWS

U.S. and allied Maritime Strategy is not a game of solitaire. The Soviet threat -- along with U. S. national and allied interests and geo-political realities -- is one of the fundamental ingredients of that strategy. No attempt can be made here, however, to recount the considerable literature that exists on Soviet naval affairs. The focus in the relatively few works listed below is how the Soviets view their own maritime strategy as well as ours, and how correctly we have divined their views. A critical issue is which missions they see as primary and which they see as secondary, for their navy and for those of the west, and whether these priorities will change soon. Much material on the Soviets also can be found in other entries in this bibliography.

Gorshkov, RADM Serge G., The Sea Power of the State, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979. See especially pp 290 and 329. ("The employment of naval forces against the sea-based strategic systems of the enemy has become most important in order to disrupt or blunt to the maximum degree their strikes against targets ashore...").

Yashin, RADM B., "The Navy in U.S. Military-Political Strategy", International Affairs (Moscow), #2, 1982. (Sees "new U.S. Naval Strategy" of Secretary Lehman as deriving from the "ocean strategy" of Admirals Zumwalt and Turner).

Rumyantsev, RADM A., "The Navy in the Plans of the Pentagon's 'New Military Strategy'", Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, June 1982, pp 59-64. (Soviet public interpretation of Reagan Administration naval policy, including Norwegian Sea Battle Group operations and Arctic SSN anti-SSBN operations. Soviets fully expectant of a USN anti-SSBN campaign).

Sturua, G. M., "The United States: Reliance on Ocean Strategy." USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology, November 1982. (A prominent soviet civilian defense analyst's views on the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy He sees it as primarily a nuclear conterforce strategy, employing submarine and carrier-launched nuclear weapons.)

U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session. Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY84: Part 6, Washington, GPO, 1983, pp. 2935 and 2939. (RADM John Butts, new Director of Naval Intelligence, gives authoritative U.S. Navy view of Soviet navy strategy, April 1983. See also updates in Butts testimony of 1984 and 1985).

McConnell, James M., "The Soviet Shift in Emphasis from Nuclear to Conventional," Vols I and II, Alexandria, VA. Center for Naval Analyses, CRC 490, June 1983. (Includes alternative views of Soviet naval strategy.)

Strelkov, Captain First Rank V., "Naval Forces in U.S. 'Direct Confrontation' Strategy", Morskoy Sbornik, No. 5, 1983, pp 78-82. (Highlights maritime roles of allies and sister services as well as USN).

Stalbo, VADM K., "U.S. Ocean Strategy," in Morskoy Sbornik, No. 10, 1983, pp. 29-36. (The Soviet Navy's leading theoretician writes in its official journal. Reaction to the Proceedings October 1982 issue on the Soviet Navy, and to statements by the Secretary of the Navy. Criticizes the "new U.S. Naval Strategy" for its geopolitical roots, its global scope, and for its aims of "isolating countries of the Socialist community from the rest of the world".)

Leighton, Marian, "Soviet Strategy Towards Northern Europe and Japan", Survey, Autumn-Winter 1983, pp 112-151. (Sees "striking and disquieting similarities" between recent "patterns of Soviet coercion against northern Europe and Japan").

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Fifth Edition), Washington: USGPO, 1985. (Latest in a series of official U.S. Navy handbooks on the Soviet fleet. See also critique by Norman Friedman in Proceedings, November 1985, pp 88-89).

Sturua, G., "Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare", USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology, February 1985. (Strategic ASW viewed as a primary USN mission.)

"Soviet Naval Activities: 1977-1984", NATO Review, February 1985, pp 17-20. (A series of charts reflecting recent Soviet exercise activity in the North Atlantic).

Bystrov, RADM Yu., "U.S. Games in the World Ocean", Literaturnaya Gazeta, September 4, 1985, p 14. (Soviet public reaction to exercise Ocean Safari 85 and other forward exercises).

Tritten, CDR James J., Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare: Weapons, Employment, and Policy, Boulder CO: Westview, 1986. (By the acting Chairman of the National Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Examination of Soviet naval missions, including implications for U.S. naval strategy. Anticipates Soviet navy wartime bastion defense, anti-carrier warfare, strategic anti-submarine warfare, and--controversially--anti-SLOC operations. See also his "Defense Strategy and Offensive Bastion", Sea Power, November 1986, pp 64-70).

Watson, CDR Bruce W., and Watson, Susan M., (eds.), The Soviet Navy: Strengths and Liabilities, Boulder CO: Westview, 1986. (See especially chapters by Richard Fisher, "Soviet SLOC Interdiction", and Keith Allen, "The Northern Fleet and North Atlantic Naval Operations", which see SLOC interdiction as more likely than most other knowledgeable experts expect, since Soviet thinking is seen as evolving toward greater consideration of protracted conventional conflict).

** George, James L., (ed.), The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View from the Mid-1980s, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986. (An outstanding collection of papers from a 1985 CNA-sponsored conference of top experts in the field, including several references to the Maritime Strategy. See especially Brad Dismukes' discussion of the contending views on Soviet Navy missions; the authoritative judgments of RADM William Studeman, RADM Thomas Brooks, and Mr. Richard Haver, the nation's top naval intelligence professionals; and the contrasting views of ADM Sylvester Foley and ADM Harry Train, two former "operators". Wayne Wright's "Soviet Operations in the Mediterranean" is especially good on the interplay of Soviet and U.S. Maritime Strategy. The excellent paper by Alvin Bernstein of the Naval War College and and the paper by Anthony Wells have also been reprinted elsewhere: the former in National Interest, Spring 1986, pp 17-29; the latter in National Defense, February 1986, pp 38-44).

Trofimenko, Ginrikh, The U.S. Military Doctrine, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986. (See especially pp 34-36 on Mahan, geopolitics, and restraining Russia; and pp 193-201 on the alleged "Blue Water Strategy" of today).

Fitzgerald, CAPT T. A., "Blitzkrieg at Sea," Proceedings, January 1986, pp. 12-16. (Argues Soviets may use their navy as a risk fleet for a "Blitzkrieg," and not for sea-denial. A view shared by many U.S. Navy operators.)

** Falin, Valentin, "Back to the Stone Age", Izvestia, January 23/24, 1986, pp 5/5. (A top Kremlin spokesman takes the Maritime Strategy to task as being "remarkably odious": "It is hardly possible to imagine anything worse". Highlights opposing arguments by Barry Posen). See also commentary by Manthorpe, CAPT William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: The Soviet Union Reacts", Proceedings, April 1986, p 111.

Petersen, Charles C., "Strategic Lessons of the Recent Soviet Naval Exercise", National Defense, February 1986, pp 32-36. (A leading strategy analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses sees Soviets' strategy threatening U.S. ports and SLOCs in addition to defending SSBNs close to their homeland. Urges USN strategic homeporting, mine warfare, and shallow-water ASW initiatives, in addition to "carrying the fight to the enemy").

** Friedman, Norman, "Soviet Naval Aviation", Naval Forces. No. 1/1986, pp 92-97. (Sees Soviet Naval Aviation as perhaps the greatest threat to NATO navies).

** Balev, B., "The Military-Political Strategy of Imperialism on the World Ocean", World Economics and International Relations, April 1986, pp 24-31. (A Soviet perspective on the Maritime Strategy -- "novaya morskaya strategiya". The three notional phases restyled as "Keeping Oneself on the Verge of War", "Seizing the Initiative", and "Carrying Combat Operations into Enemy Territory").

** Komenskiy, Captain First Rank V., "The NATO Strategic Command in the Atlantic" and "Combat Exercises of the Combined NATO Forces in 1985", Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, April 1986 (pp 47-53 and August 1986 pp 45-51). (Includes discussion of roles and missions of NATO naval forces in the context of the Maritime Strategy). See also Rodin, Colonel V, "The Military Doctrines of Japan", August 1986, pp 3-9.

Ries, Tomas and Skorve, Johnny, Investigating Kola: A Study of Military Bases Using Satellite Photos, Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1986. (See especially pp 21-49, on the place of Fenno-Scandia and adjacent waters in the context of overall Soviet strategy).

MccGwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.), "Soviet Military Objectives", World Policy Journal, Fall 1986, pp 667-695. (Adapted from his book, cited below. Much that goes against the grain of contemporary informed conventional wisdom regarding Soviet intentions, including the naval threat. Mediterranean seen as particularly important. See especially pp 676-680).

** Manthorpe, CAPT William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: RimPac-86", Proceedings, October 1986, p 191. (The Soviets see linkages between the Maritime Strategy and allied exercises).

van Tol, Robert, "Soviet Naval Exercises 1983-1985", Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 18-34. (Most useful in its discussion of the interactions between NATO and Soviet strategies and between NATO and Soviet exercises).

MccGwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.), Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, Washington: Brookings, 1987. (Individualistic, iconoclastic, and debatable).

Schandler, Herbert Y., "Arms Control in Northeast Asia", The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1987, pp 69-79. (Wide-ranging article which gives the context within which the Maritime Strategy operates in the Pacific. Highlights "the ever-looming nightmare of a two-front war" as gaining in credibility for the Soviet Union. "This two-front threat is enormously important to Soviet psychology and provides the United States with a major pressure point on Soviet leaders").

** Mozgovoy, Aleksandr, "For Security on Sea Routes", International Affairs (Moscow), 1/1987, pp 77-84, 103. (See especially p 83, on the Maritime Strategy as "an unprecedentedly impudent document, even given the militaristic hysteria reigning in Washington today").

** Manthorpe, CAPT William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: More Than Meets the Eye", Proceedings, February 1987, pp 117-118. (Sophisticated analysis of 3-4 October 1986 Red Star article on potential changes in Soviet doctrine, strategic thinking and planning that, if adopted, will have important implications for Soviet response to the Maritime Strategy).

* Weinberger, Caspar, Soviet Military Power 1987, Washington: USGPO, March 1987. (More extensive analysis of Soviet strategy and operational concepts than in previous five editions).

* U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, "Current Intelligence Issues", Washington: Department of the Navy Office of Information, March 1987. (See especially pp 1-4 on the anticipated employment of Soviet naval forces in wartime).

** Breemer, Jan, "U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Re-Appraisal", Naval Forces, II/1987, pp 64-76. (Discusses the background behind and the issues surrounding current U.S. Navy thinking on Soviet naval strategy).

** Elliott, Frank, "Soviets Knew of Maritime Strategy Before Lehman, Watkins Publicized It", Defense Week May 4 1987, p 5. (Reports on important Seminar on Soviet views of the Maritime Strategy. See also Seminar transcript, Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1987).

** Daniel, Donald C.F., "The Soviet Navy and Tactical Nuclear War at Sea", Survival, July/August 1987, pp 138+. (The Director of the Naval War College's Strategy and Campaign Department concludes, inter alia, that Soviet decision makers will use nuclear weapons at sea only if they have already been used ashore, or if NATO uses them at sea first).

VII. PEACETIME, CRISES, AND THIRD WORLD CONTINGENCIES

Most of the above works deal principally with use of the Navy in general war. What follows are books and articles of the 1970s and 1980s discussing the uses of the U.S. Navy in peacetime, crises, and "small wars" (the "Violent Peace" of the Maritime Strategy). Many of these derive from the increased discussion of peacetime presence as a naval mission engendered by Admirals Elmo Zumwalt and Stansfield Turner in the early 1970s. Thus, the contemporary era of U.S. Navy thought on peacetime presence operations began about five years prior to that on forward global wartime operational concepts. Both bodies of thought, however, have build on the earlier literature of the late 1950s and 1960s on the role of the U.S. Navy in limited war.

While most of the items listed below focus on the U.S. Navy, there is a significant literature on the peacetime/crisis/"small war" activities of the Royal Navy and the Soviet Navy as well, some of the most important elements of which have been included here. In addition, certain of the "White Papers" and "Defense Reports" published by various defense ministries around the world routinely highlight the peacetime operations of their naval forces. Especially notable in this regard are the annual British "Defense Estimates" and Canadian "Annual Reports."

Joint Senate/House Armed Services Subcommittee. Ninety-First Congress, Second Session. Hearings on CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier, Washington: USGPO, 1970. pp. 162-165. (Listing of uses of USN in wars/near-wars 1946-1969; takes negative view of same.

Cable, James, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force, New York: Praeger, 1970. (First of a spate of useful books seeking to list, classify, and describe peacetime uses of navies. Surveys twentieth century activities of all major navies. Updated in 1981.

Howe, CDR Jonathan, Multicrisis: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1971. (The 1967 Mideast crisis, the 1958 Quemoy crisis, and the effectiveness of conventional naval forces as foreign policy instruments, by a future flag officer and political-military affairs sub-specialist. Argues for a strong global naval posture, especially in the Mediterranean).

Bull, Hedley, "Sea Power and Political Influence", in Power at Sea: I. The New Environment, Adelphi Paper Number 122, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974, pp 1-9. ("The period we are now entering will be one in which opportunities for the diplomatic use of naval forces, at least for the great powers, will be severely circumscribed").

Moore, CAPT J.E., RN, "The Business of Surveillance", Navy International , June 1974, pp 9-10. (Rationale for peacetime surveillance operations at sea).

McGruther, LCDR Kenneth. "The Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy," Naval War College Review, September-October 1974, pp 3-20. (Part of the initial Zumwalt-Turner new look at USN "Naval Presence" mission. Includes Indian Ocean case study and a "cookbook". By a future OP-603 staffer).

McNulty, CDR James, "Naval Presence - The Misunderstood Mission." Naval War College Review, September-October 1974, pp 21-31. (Another reflection of the initial Zumwalt-Turner focus on presence. See also Turner, VADM Stansfield, "Challenge," pp 1-2, in the same issue.

Luttwak, Edward N., The Political Uses of Sea Power, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. (Short treatment sponsored by VADM Turner. Typology and analysis based on concept of "suasion." Focus on the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean.)

Young, Elizabeth, "New Laws for Old Navies: Military Implications of the Law of the Sea," Survival, November-December 1974, pp 262-267. (Forecasts the demise of naval diplomacy.)

Hill, CAPT J. R., RN, "Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea", Survival, Mar/Apr 1975, pp 69-72. (Takes issue with Young's article. Suggests that, "in the turbulent future, maritime forces are likely to be more rather than less in demand both at home and away").

MccGwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.), "Changing Naval Operations and Military Intervention", in Stern, Ellen P., The Limits of Military Intervention, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977, pp 151-178, and reprinted in Naval War College Review, Spring 1977, pp 3-25. (Sees numerous constraints now in place on the "almost casual use of force which used to be the norm" in military intervention by sea).

MccGwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.) and McDonnell, John (eds.), Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions, New York: Praeger, 1977. (See especially chapters by MccGwire, Booth, Dismukes, and Kelly).

Booth, Ken, Navies and Foreign Policy, London: Croon Helm, 1977. (Magisterial treatment.)

Mahoney, Robert B., Jr., "U.S. Navy Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1955-1975," Washington: Center for Naval Analyses, 1977. (Survey of USN crisis operations and summaries of incidents and responses.

Nathan, James A. and Oliver, James K., "The Evolution of International Order and the Future of the American Naval Presence Mission", Naval War College Review, Fall 1977, pp 37-59. (Sees political and technological changes as necessitating revision to contemporary thinking on naval presence, just when that thinking had begun to solidify).

Eldredge, CAPT Howard S., "Nonsuperpower Sea Denial Capability: The Implications for Superpower Navies Engaged in Presence Operations", in Ra'anan, Uri et al. (eds.), Arms Transfers to the Third World, Boulder CO: Westview, 1978, pp 21-64. (Argues that growing sea denial arsenals of littoral nations are complicating the risk calculations of the superpowers in using naval forces to further their interests. Focus on anti-ship missiles and submarine torpedoes).

Blechman, Barry M., and Kaplan, Stephen S., Force Without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978. (Utility of USN vs. other U. S. armed forces.)

Congressional Budget Office, "U. S. Naval Forces: The Peacetime Presence Mission," Washington: 1978. (How it could allegedly be done with fewer CVs.)

Zakheim, Dov S., "Maritime Presence, Projection, and the Constraints of Parity", in Equivalence, Sufficiency and the International Balance, Washington: National Defense University, August 1978, pp 101-118. (Argues for a combined arms approach, vice solely naval focus, re: U.S. maritime presence).

Dismukes, Bradford and McConnell, James M., (eds.), Soviet Naval Diplomacy, New York: Pergamon Press, 1979 (Comprehensive surveys and analyses.)

Madison, CDR Russell L., "The War of Unengaged Forces -- Superpowers at Sea in an Era of Competitive Coexistence", Naval War College Review, March-April 1979, pp 82-94. (Thoughtful piece seeking to integrate naval peacetime and wartime missions into one framework: the "Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare").

Smith, Edward Allen, Jr., "Naval Confrontation: The Intersuperpower Use of Naval Suasion in Times of Crisis", Ph.D. Dissertation, American University, 1979. (Examination of U.S. and Soviet use of their navies in six postwar crises. Heavily influenced by Luttwak's concept of "naval suasion").

Allen, CAPT Charles D., Jr., USN (Ret.), The Uses of Navies in Peacetime, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980. Excellent short analysis, with typology. (Focus on postwar U.S. Navy, and on escalation.)

Kaplan, Stephen S., Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981. (Does for the Soviets what Blechman and Kaplan did for the U.S.)

Cohen, Raymond, International Politics: The Rules of the Game, London, Longman, 1981, pp. 41-48. (One of the few general works on international relations by an academic political scientist to deal in any depth with the peacetime and crisis uses of navies. Navy force movements seen as part of the "vocabulary of international politics.")

Truver, Scott C., "New International Constraints on Military Power: Navies in the Political Role", Naval War College Review, July-August 1981, pp 99-104. (Sees regular employment of major naval combatants and large-deck carriers as becoming less tenable in Third World areas for the remainder of the century, for a variety of reasons).

Neutze, CDR Dennis R., JAGC, "Bluejacket Diplomacy: A Juridical Examination of the Use of Naval Forces in Support of United States Foreign Policy", JAG Journal, Summer 1982, pp 81-158. (By the legal advisor to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations. Very comprehensive examination of the lawfulness of the political uses of U.S. naval power in terms of domestic and international law, going back to the framers of the Constitution. Sees such political uses as expanding in the future).

Taylor, COL William J., Jr., USA (Ret.), and Cottrell, Alvin J., "Stability, Political Decay, and Navies," Orbis, Fall 1982, pp. 579-522. (Limitations of naval interventions.)

Wright, Christopher C., III, "U. S. Naval Operations in 1982." Proceedings/Naval Review, May 1983. Excellent survey and analysis. (Includes general introduction to USN concepts of operations, deployment patterns, tempo of operations, as well as review of actual deployments.) See also annual updates in subsequent Naval Reviews.

Hickman, LCDR WIlliam J., "Did it Really Matter?" Naval War College Review, March-April 1983, pp. 17-30. (By a future OP-603 staffer. On limitations and misuses of USN naval presence operations. Indian Ocean case study is useful counterpoint to McGruther article a decade earlier, above.)

Barnett, CAPT Roger W., "The U.S. Navy's Role in Countering Maritime Terrorism", Terrorism, Vol 6, No 3, 1983, pp 469-480. (A primary architect of the Maritime Strategy argues that while the U.S. Navy is well prepared against attacks on its own ships and installations, its role in deterring terrorist attacks on U.S. merchant ships or overseas facilities "cannot be suggested to be a large one").

Zelikow, Philip D., "Force Without War, 1975-82," Journal of Strategic Studies, March 1984, pp. 29-54. (Updates Blechman and Kaplan book. Also provides listing of incidents when USN was used.)

Cable, Sir James, "Showing the Flag," Proceedings, April 1984, pp. 59-63. (The utility of ship visits.)

Luttwak, Edward N., The Pentagon and the Art of War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, pp. 222, 247-248. (Sees diminishing value of peacetime deployments.)

Howe, RADM Jonathan T., "Multicrisis Management: Meeting an Expanding Challenge", in Uri Ra'anan and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (eds.), Security Commitments and Capabilities: Elements of An American Global Strategy, Hamden CT: Archon Books, 1985, pp 125-137. (Reflections on America's ability to manage "multicrises", through naval as well as other means, by the U.S. naval officer who popularized the term 15 years earlier).

Martin, Laurence, "The Use of Naval Forces in Peacetime", Naval War College Review, January-February 1985, pp 4-14. (A lecture summarizing many contemporary themes on the subject).

* U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986, Part 8, Washington: USGPO, 1986, pp 4409-4448. (VADM James A. Lyons on "Global Naval Commitments", February 28, 1985. The official policy enunciated by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06)).

Arnott, CDR Ralph E. and Gaffney, CDR William A., "Naval Presence: Sizing the Force", Naval War College Review, March-April 1985, pp 18-30. (Seeks to develop a rational structured approach to choosing a force tailored to respond to a particular crisis, so as to achieve the desired outcome with minimum effect on scheduled fleet operations).

Lehman, John F., Jr., "An Absolute Requirement for Every American," Sea Power, April 1985, p. 13. (SECNAV argues high USN peacetime operating tempo is partly self-generated. See also Washington Post, October 6, 1985, p. A12, and Virginia Pilot/Ledger Star, October 27, 1985, p. A1.)

Daniel, Donald C., and Tarleton, Gael D., "The Soviet Navy in 1984," Proceedings/Naval Review, May 1985, pp. 90-92, 361-364. (Snapshot of one year's Soviet global peacetime activity See subsequent Naval Reviews for updates.)

Etzold, Thomas H., "Neither Peace Nor War: Navies and Low-intensity Conflict," in Ullman, Harlan K., and Etzold, Thomas H., Future Imperative: National Security and the U.S. Navy in the Late 1980s, Washington: CSIS, 1985. (Argues low-intensity USN contingencies and peacetime operations are on the increase.)

Levine, Daniel B., Planning for Underway Replenishment of Naval Forces in Peacetime (CRM 85-77), Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, September 1985. (Much more than underway replenishment. Examines U.S. Navy fleet exercises, crisis response and surveillance operations. Analyses them by ocean area, frequency, and number/types of combatants used).

Harris, CDR R. Robinson, and Benkert, LCDR Joseph, "Is That All There Is?", Proceedings, October 1985, pp. 32-37. (Contrasts peacetime and global war strategy requirements, with focus on surface combatants.)

Booth, Ken, Law, Force, and Diplomacy at Sea, London: George Allen & Unwin. 1985. (Peacetime naval strategy and the Law of the Sea, and much more. Rebuts Elizabeth Young arguments of a decade earlier, pp. 66-68.)

Hill, RADM J.R., RN, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986. (Chapter 6, "Normal Conditions", pp 88-110, describes the various roles of navies, especially those of medium sized countries, in peacetime. Chapter 7, "Low Intensity Operations", pp 88-131, covers operations somewhat higher up on the scale of violence).

Parritt, Brigadier Brian, Violence at Sea: A Review of Terrorism, Acts of War and Piracy, and Countermeasures to Prevent Terrorism, Paris: ICC Publishing, 1986. (See especially Paul Wilkinson's "Terrorism and the Maritime Environment", pp 35-40, on the role of navies in combating terrorism and the kinds of naval force required).

Mandel, Robert, "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy", International Studies Quarterly, March 1986, pp 59-76. ("The most effective gunboat diplomacy involves a definitive, deterrent display of force undertaken by an assailant who has engaged in war in the victim's region and who is militarily prepared and politically stable compared to the victim").

** Elliot, Frank, "Battleships Assume Some Carrier Duties", Navy Times, March 31, 1986, pp 25, 28. (Role of battleships vis-a-vis carriers in the presence mission).

** Vlahos, Michael, "The Third World in U.S. Navy Planning", Orbis, Spring 1986, pp 133-148. (By a former Naval War College faculty member. Argues the U.S. Navy has recently refocused its attention on its contributions to a global allied campaign against the Soviets, to the detriment of planning for more likely and qualitatively different Third World contingencies).

Cable, Sir James, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future", Proceedings, August 1986, pp 36-41. (Forcefully argues that the days of gunboat diplomacy are by no means over. Denigrates those who have said otherwise).

Coutau-Begarie, Herve, "The Role of the Navy in French Foreign Policy", Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 36-43. (By probably the most important contemporary French writer on naval strategy. The recent French global experience, one not often discussed in an English-language literature dominated by U.S., British, and Soviet examples).

"Navy Cuts Carrier Presence in Mediterranean, Gulf Areas", Washington Times, 24 November 1986, p 4-D. (On adjustments to U.S. Navy routine forward presence posture to enhance Navy flexibility and reduce individual ship OPTEMPO).

James, Lawrence, "Old Problems and Old Answers: Gunboat Diplomacy Today", Defense Analysis, December 1986, pp 324-327. (On its limitations, past and present).

Bush, Ted, "Sailors Spending More Time at Home Under PersTempo", Navy Times, February 9, 1987, p 3. (On naval presence and morale. The U.S. Navy tries to balance conflicting requirements). See also Philpott, Tom and Burlage, John, "Stepped Up Operations May Cut Home Port Time", Navy Times, June 22, 1987, pp 1+8; and Burlage, John, "CNO Trost: No Retreat on OpTempo", Navy Times, July 13, 1987, pp 1 + 26.

Cable, Sir James, "Showing the Flag: Past and Present", Naval Forces, No. III/1987, pp 38-49. (Update of Cable's thought on this particular aspect of peacetime naval operations). Cf his views in the April 1984 Proceedings, cited above.

Jordan, COL Amos A., USA (Ret), "A National Strategy for the 1990s", The Washington Quarterly: Summer 1987, p 15. (The president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies sees Third World peoples as increasingly uncowed by "gunboat diplomacy and other similar kinds of hollow threats").

VIII. FLEET BALANCE: ATLANTIC VS. PACIFIC VS. MEDITERRANEAN

Geographic flexibility is one of the great strengths of naval power. Yet the U. S. Navy's global posture since World War II has often looked like a series of hard-and-fast theater commitments, more appropriate to less flexible land-based types of forces. The articles and letters below illustrate current problems of implementing a balanced global Maritime Strategy with limited naval forces in the face of competing regional demands. They were selected because of their focus on the need for hard choices by the Navy regarding fleet balance; articles merely trumpeting the importance of an area or discussing regional priorities solely at the geopolitical level are omitted.

Booth, Ken, "U. S. Naval Strategy: Problems of Survivability, Usability, and Credibility," Naval War College Review, Summer 1978, pp. 11-28. (Argues for withdrawal of Sixth Fleet.)

McGruther, LCDR Kenneth R., "Two Anchors in the Pacific: A Strategy Proposal for the U. S. Pacific Fleet," Naval Review 1979/Proceedings May 1979, pp. 126-141. (On reorienting the Pacific Fleet primarily northward for wartime operations, and secondarily westward, for peacetime presence, by a former OP-603 staffer.)

Etzold, Thomas, "From Far East to Middle East: Overextension in American Strategy Since World War II", Proceedings/Naval Review 1981, May 1981, pp. 66-77. (On the need to make hard strategic choices, especially between the Pacific and Indian Ocean.)

Cole, CDR Bernard, "Atlantic First," Proceedings, August 1982, pp. 103-106. Also "Comment and Discussion:" December 1982, pp. 86-87.

Deutermann, CAPT Peter, "Requiem for the Sixth Fleet," Proceedings, September 1982, pp. 46-49. Also "Comment and Discussion:" November 1982, p. 14; January 1983, pp. 17-20; February 1983, pp. 80-81; March 1983, pp. 12-17; July 1983, p. 89.

Breemer, Jan S., "De-Committing the Sixth Fleet," Naval War College Review. November-December 1982, pp. 27-32.

Jampoler, CAPT Andrew, "Reviewing the Conventional Wisdom," Proceedings, July 1983, pp. 22-28. Also "Comment and Discussion:" December 1983, p. 26. (On refocusing the Atlantic Fleet from the Mediterranean to the North Atlantic).

Ortlieb, CDR E. V., "Forward Deployments: Deterrent or Temptation." Proceedings, December 1983, pp. 36-40. Also "Comment and Discussion:" February 1984, p. 22. (On reducing the Sixth and Seventh Fleets while increasing the Second and Third).

Maiorano, LT Alan, "A Fresh Look at the Sixth Fleet," Proceedings, February 1984, pp. 52-58. Also "Comment and Discussion:" July 1984, pp. 28-33. (On reducing the USN Mediterranean commitment, with USAF and allied forces filling any gaps).

Dismukes, Bradford, and Weiss, Kenneth G., "Mare Mosso: The Mediterranean Theater," in James L. George (ed.), The U. S. Navy: The View From the Mid-1980s, Boulder CO, Westview, (On timing reductions in U.S. Navy Mediterranean forces).

Sestak, LCDR Joseph, "Righting the Atlantic Tilt," Proceedings, January 1986, pp. 64-71.

Kolodziej, Edward A., "The Southern Flank: NATO's Neglected Front", AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, Vol. 6 No. 2, 1986, pp. 45-56, especially pp. 48-50. (A leading political scientist endorses CAPT Deutermann's views on reorienting U.S. naval concentrations from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.)

** Lee, Ngoc and Hinge, LCDR Alan, RAN, "The Naval Balance in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region", Naval Forces, II/1987, pp 150-175. (Views the U.S. Navy as under strength for warfighting in the Atlantic-Mediterranean threats, and over strength in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Essentially an update of Hinge's August 1986 article, cited in Section II above).

IX. WAR GAMING

As is well discussed in previous sections, U.S. and allied navies, other services, and joint and allied commands have a variety of means at their disposal in peacetime to test the wartime validity of aspects of the Maritime Strategy, besides debate and discussion. They actually participate in fleet exercises, advanced tactical training , and "real world" peacetime and crisis operations, and they conduct extensive operations analyses and war games. Most of these avenues are generally inaccessible to the public, however, save one: gaming. There are over a half-dozen commercial board and computer games now available that can provide players with insights into modern maritime strategic, operational, and tactical problems and potential solutions, and thereby further enhance players' understanding of the Maritime Strategy. Like all simulations, however, they each have their limitations, and even built-in inaccuracies (as the various reviews point out). Thus they cannot by themselves legitimately be used to "prove" validities or demonstrate "outcomes". Nevertheless, playing them is the nearest many students and theorists of Maritime Strategy can ever come to actually "being there", and therefore is an activity that can only be encouraged.

A. Commentary

** Perla, Peter C., "Wargaming and the U.S. Navy", National Defense, February 1987, pp 49-53. (By a leading Center for Naval Analyses war gamer. "The Navy is continuing a process of using wargaming, exercises, and analysis to address the aspects of major issues for which they are best suited... a classic example of this process can be seen at work in the 2nd Fleet. Taking the promulgated maritime strategy as his starting point, the commander, 2nd Fleet, proposed a concept for operating the NATO Striking Fleet in the Norwegian Sea. A wargame was held at the Naval War College to explore this concept, and analysis was undertaken to quantify some of the issues raised by the game. Then an exercise was held in the area of interest, which confirmed some assumptions and raised new questions. A new series of games and analysis was capped by a second major exercise, as the process continues"). See also his "What Wargaming is and is Not", co-authored by LCDR Raymond T. Barrett, Naval War College Review, September-October 1985, pp 70-78 (and "In My View..." commentary, Naval War College Review, Autumn 1986, pp. 105-108); and "War Games, Analyses, and Exercises", Naval War College Review, Spring 1987, pp. 44-52 (and endorsement by former CNO ADM Thomas Hayward, USN (Ret), in August 1987 Proceedings).

Connors, LCDR Tracy D., USNR, "Gaming for the World", Proceedings, January 1984, pp 106-108. (On the Naval War College's Global War Game series, a principal research tool for identifying critical Navy, joint, and allied Maritime Strategy issues). See also Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting Perspective", Proceedings, October 1983, pp 66-81; and Eulis, CDR James, "War Gaming at the U.S. Naval War College", Naval Forces, 1985/V, pp 96-103.

B. Games

Grigsby, Gary, North Atlantic '86, Mountain View, CA: Strategic Simulations Inc., 1983 (Apple Computer Game). Reviewed by John Gresham and Michael Markowitz, Proceedings, July 1984, pp 116-117. (Entering premise in the initial failure of NATO, U.S., and the Maritime Strategy: "The great war in Europe is over. As expected, Russia won; it now controls all of Germany and Norway. Its next plan: complete domination of the North Atlantic through the isolation of Great Britain").

Nichols, W.J., Grey Seas, Grey Skies, Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations Canada, 1983 (second edition forthcoming in 1987) (Apple Computer Game). Reviewed by John Gresham and Michael Markowitz, Proceedings, July 1984, pp 116-117. (Seven "pre-built" scenarios, including Japanese destroyers versus Soviet submarines in the Kuril Islands, a Soviet amphibious group versus West German forces in the Baltic, U.S. versus Soviet carrier battle groups off the North Cape, and similar clashes in the Western Pacific and the Mediterranean. Focus is more tactical than the other games listed here).

Nichols, W.J., Fifth Escadra, Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations Canada, 1984 (Apple Computer Game). (Soviets vs NATO in the Mediterranean. Five levels of conflict ranging from rising tensions to global nuclear war).

Nichols, W. J., Seventh Fleet, Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations Canada, 1985 (Apple Computer Game). (Soviets vs U.S. and Japan. Includes Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, and South China Sea operations).

Balkoski, Joseph, Sixth Fleet, New York: Victory Games, 1986 (Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian Michael A. Palmer, Strategy and Tactics, January-February 1986, pp 51-52. ("The inclusion of random elements into the system, the addition of logistic rules, and the key role of Soviet naval aviation made the Sixth Fleet game an excellent operational level naval wargame").

** Balkoski, Joseph, Second Fleet, New York: Victory Games, 1986 (Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian Michael A. Palmer, Proceedings, March 1987, pp 160-162. ("Those of us without access to the War College's computers can test the waters north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap and gain insight into the problems and opportunities inherent in the application of the Maritime Strategy". Can be played simultaneously with Sixth Fleet, with forces shifted from one set of maps to the other, in a simulation of war in both Northern and Southern European waters and adjacent areas).

Herman, Mark, Aegean Strike, New York: Victory Games, 1986 (Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian Michael A. Palmer, Strategy and Tactics, (forthcoming in 1987). (The eastern Mediterranean. "Few, if any, games...better integrate the strengths and weaknesses of land, air, and naval assets").

X. ANTECEDENTS

The general and historical literature on naval strategy is admittedly vast. What is presented here are only books that describe earlier strategies -- conceptualized, planned and/or implemented -- which are analogous to key aspects of the U. S. Navy's Maritime Strategy today. The materials are generally listed chronologically, by historical period covered.

Till, Geoffrey, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, (Second Edition), New York: St. Martin's, 1984. (Basic one-volume historical and topical survey.)

Callwell, Major C.E., BA, The Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns Since Waterloo, Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1897 (especially pp 178-182 and 196-197); Barker, A. J., The War Against Russia, 1854-1856, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970; Curtiss, John Shelton, Russia's Crimean War, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979; and Rich, Norman, Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale, Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1985 (especially pp 124-126, 136-137, 158-159, 178, 201-202, 206-209). (Successful maritime global forward coalition strategy against Russia 130 years ago, with operations in Barents, Baltic, and Black Seas, and off Kuriles and Kamchatka. Component of a larger military strategy, which blocked subsequent Russian expansion for over 20 years).

** Mahan, CAPT Alfred Thayer, "The Problem of Asia", in his The Problem of Asia and Its Effect Upon International Politics, Cambridge MA: University Press, 1900, pp 1-146. (Mahan on "restraining Russia", the central problem of the Maritime Strategy: "The Russian centre cannot be broken. It is upon, and from, the flanks... that restraint, if needed, must come" (p 26); "hence ensues solidarity of interest between Germany, Great Britain, Japan and the United States" (p 63)). See also Trofimenko, in Section VI above, and Crowl, Philip A., "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian", in Paret, Peter (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp 444-477, especially p 477. (A Naval War College professor emeritus asserts the Maritime Strategy is antithetical to Mahan's teaching, especially as regards the role of other services, in a book which otherwise--and to its detriment--pays scant attention to makers of modern maritime strategy. Trofimenko gets the linkage between Mahan and the Maritime Strategy right. Crowl gets it wrong).

Schilling, Warner R., "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919," PhD. Dissertation, Yale University, 1954. ("Maritime Strategy" of the 1980s was not first time this century U.S. Navy developed a coherent preferred strategy.)

Palmer, Alan, The Gardeners of Salonika, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965. See especially pp. 226-247. (Southern Flank Maritime Strategy in action. WWI allies advance to the Danube from beachhead in Greece in 1918 knocking Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey out of the war. Gallipoli concept vindicated.)

Roskill, Stephen W., Naval Policy Between the Wars, Volume I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929, New York: Walker, 1968. Chapter III: "The War of Intervention in Russia, 1918-1920"; and Dobson, Christopher, and Miller, John, The Day They Almost Bombed Moscow: The Allied War in Russia, 1918-1920, New York: Atheneum, 1986, pp 42-47, 72-73, 247-266, and 274-276. (Poorly devised global, allied, forward maritime operations against the Soviets 70 years ago, which, however, did achieve independence for the Baltic states).

** Miller, Edward S., War Plan Orange, 1897-1945: The Naval Campaign Through the Central Pacific, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, forthcoming in 1988. (History's most successful pre-war plan, with lessons for the complex problems of naval strategic planning of the 1980s). See also Dyer, VADM George C., On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson, USN (Retired), Washington: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973, Chapter XIV: "War Plans"; and Shelton, CDR Michael W., CEC, "Plan Orange Revisited", Proceedings, December 1984, pp 50-56; and "Comment and Discussion", March 1985, pp 73 and 79. (Draws false parallels between the Western Pacific in 1941 and the Norwegian Sea today, i.e. between a purely naval, unilateral, theater problem and one portion of a joint, allied, global problem. Advocates ceding the Norwegian Sea, Norway, and Iceland to the Soviets. Bad history and worse strategy).

** Vlahos, Michael, "Wargaming, an Enforcer of Strategic Realism: 1919-1942", Naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 7--22. (By a former Naval War College faculty member. How wargaming prepared the U.S. Navy for war in 1941, and how it is doing so again today, including linkage between gaming and planning).

** Reynolds, Clark G., "The Maritime Strategy of World War II: Some Implications?", Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, pp 43-50. (By a former Naval Academy faculty member. Gleans lessons and implications for today's Maritime Strategy from that of World War II).

** Turner, ADM Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "Victory at Sea: Bull Halsey at Leyte Gulf". Washington Post Book World, Dec 15, 1986, pp 1 & 13. (Review of E.B. Potter's Bull Halsey. Draws analogies to today's military problems, especially regarding "the offense and the defense". Of a piece with Turner's other writings).

Erickson, John, The Road to Stalingrad (Vol. I) and The Road to Berlin (Vol. II), Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1983. See especially Vol. I: pp. 14, 55-57, 218, 237-240, 271-272, 295; Vol. II: pp. 43, 132, 156. (Effect of Far East operations -- or lack thereof -- on Central/East Europe Front in World War II.)

Spykman, Nicholas John, The Geography of the Peace, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944. (Basic geopolitical reference. See especially maps, pp. 50-54.)

Love, Robert, B., Jr. (Ed.), The Chiefs of Naval Operations, Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1980. (See sections on post-World War II CNOs' views on strategy, especially Rosenberg piece on Arleigh Burke).

Rosenberg, David, "American Postwar Air Doctrine and Organization: The Navy Experience," in A. F. Hurley and R. C. Ehrhart, et al. Air Power and Warfare, Washington: USGPO, 1970. (Antecedent naval postwar air strike strategies; by a leading historian of U. S. Navy postwar strategy.)

Nimitz, FADM Chester, "Future Employment of Naval Forces," Vital Speeches, Jan. 15, 1948, pp. 214-217. (Also, in Brassey's Naval Annual: 1948, and Shipmate, February 1948, pp. 5-6+, as "Our Navy. It's Future.") (Argues for a projection strategy and a Navy capable of land attack early in a war.)

Cave Brown, Anthony (Ed.), Dropshot, The American Plan for World War III Against Russia in 1957, New York: Dial Press, 1978. (1949 JCS study: good example of early post-war strategic thinking. See especially pp. 161-165, 206-211, 225-235.) (Not to be read without examination of review by David Rosenberg and Thomas E. Kelly III, Naval War College Review, Fall 1978, pp. 103-106.)

** Palmer, Michael A., Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade, Washington : Naval Historical Center (forthcoming in 1988). (An important discussion of the similarities and differences in U.S. naval strategic thought between the first and fifth postwar decades, the two postwar eras most characterized by US Navy concern with problems of naval warfighting vis-a-vis the Soviet Union itself).

** Friedman, Norman, The Postwar Naval Revolution, London: Conway Maritime Press, 1986. See especially Chapter 10, "Epilogue", pp 212-218. (On allied naval developments in the first post-World War II decade, including relationships to the Maritime Strategy developed three decades later).

Rosenberg, David, Arleigh Burke and the United States Navy, Vol I: War and Cold War, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, (forthcoming in 1988). (By a Naval War College faculty member. "Maybe it would help us sell the Navy's case if we could make a presentation on how the Navy could function in the first 90 days of a war, and keep that presentation up to date "--RADM Burke in 1952 after relieving as OP-30, now OP-60).

Huntington, Samuel P., "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy", Proceedings, May 1954, pp 483-93. (Clearly foreshadows the basic outline of the Maritime Strategy. An analysis generally as relevant today as then).

Marolda, Edward J., "The Influence of Burke's Boys on Limited War", Proceedings, August 1981, pp 36-41. (By a prominent Navy Department historian on the influence of the Navy officer corps on national strategy a generation ago. "Between 1956 and 1960, the Navy added its considerable influence to the intellectual campaign within the national defense community for a reorientation in strategic policy").

Wylie, CAPT J.C., "Why A Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor", Proceedings, August 1957, pp 811-817. (By the Navy's leading public strategist of the 1950s and 60s. Remarkably similar to the views expressed in the Maritime Strategy a generation later)

** Rosenberg, David, U.S. Navy Long-Range Planning: A Historical Perspective, Washington: USGPO (forthcoming in 1988).

Wylie, RADM J. C., Military Strategy, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967. (Codification of views of USN's most prominent post-war strategic theorist.)

Gray, Colin S., The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution, New York: Crane Russak, 1977. (Analyzes and updates geopolitical grand theory. Stresses maritime aspects of the Western alliance and global nature of Western security problems.

Comptroller General of the United States, Implications of the National Security Council Study "U.S. Maritime Strategy and Naval Force Requirements" On the Future Naval Ship Force (PSAD-78-6A) ,Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 7, 1978. (Discusses in detail--and in highly unsympathetic terms--the classified 1976 NSC study often cited by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman as triggering his thinking on U.S. naval strategy and force levels. See also Rumsfeld, Donald, "Which Five-Year Shipbuilding Program?", Proceedings, February 1977, pp 18-25).

Lehman, John, Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978. (Codification of Lehman's thought on naval strategy before becoming SECNAV. Much more than carriers, especially Chapter II). See also his March 1980 testimony in U.S. Senate, Committee on the Budget, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on National Defense: Alternative Approaches to the U.S. Defense Program, Washington: USGPO, 1980, pp 208-253.

U.S. Navy, Sea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study (Unclassified Executive Summary), Washington, DC: 28 March 1978. (A progenitor of the Maritime Strategy. Whereas the latter stresses the role of the Navy in a global conventional war with the Soviets, however, the former tended more toward emphasizing the extent of the range of potential uses of naval power).

Ryan, CAPT Paul USN (Ret), First Line of Defense, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981. (Mainstream USN perspectives on post-war defense policies through the Carter Administration.)

XI. MAKING MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: INFLUENCES

Snyder, Jack, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984. Chapter I. (On how military strategy gets made, and why. Geopolitical, bureaucratic, and personal factors. View military as predictably and unfortunately biased toward offensive strategies.) See also his "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914", in Robert Jervis, et al. (eds.), Psychology and Deterrence, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985, pp 162-164. (Summarizes the literature on the alleged "Military Bias for the Offensive").

Sagan, Scott D., "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability", International Security, Fall 1986, pp 151-175. (An excellent piece. Takes issue with literature on the alleged "Military Bias for the Offensive". "Offensive military doctrines are needed not only by states with expansionist war aims, but also by states that have a strong interest in protecting an exposed ally". See also Snyder, Jack and Sagan, Scott D., "Correspondence: The Origins of Offense and the Consequences of Counterforce", Winter 1986-87, pp 187-198).

Bartlett, Henry C., "Approaches to Force Planning", Naval War College Review, May-June 1985, pp 37-48. (By a Naval War College faculty member. Provides eight approaches to Force Planning, but each such "approach" can--and does--apply to the drafting of Strategy as well. They are presented by the author as pure types, stark alternatives, but in actual practice (for example, in the development of the Maritime Strategy) their influence on the strategist is often simultaneous, to a greater or lesser degree. His list of approaches: "top-down", "bottom-up", "scenario", "threat", "mission", "hedging", "technology", and "fiscal". The first four were probably the most important influences on the Maritime Strategy of the late 1940s-early 1950s and the 1980's; "Mission" and "hedging" were relatively more important from the late 1950s through the mid-1970s. "Threat" influences tended to be driven more by perceived capabilities in the 1940s through the 1970s and more by perceived intentions in the 1980s. Critics tend to focus on "technology" and "budget" influences. There is actually also a ninth approach, "historical/academic" approach, which tends to focus the strategist on "lessons of history" and/or the great classics of military thought. All these approaches coexist with the organizational and psychological influences on war planning identified by Jack Snyder. The remaining citations in this section give examples, drawn primarily from the Maritime Strategy debates).

Johnson, CAPT W. Spencer, "Comment and Discussion" "Strategy: Ours vs Theirs'", Proceedings, September 1984, p 107. (One of the initial drafters of the Maritime Strategy elaborates on the necessity, utility and existence of a national military strategy from which the Maritime Strategy is derived. The "top-down" view of strategy-building written in response to McGruther's "threat-based" approach, cited below. See also "Comment and Discussion", Proceedings, April 1984, p 31).

Hughes, CAPT Wayne P., USN (Ret.), "Naval Tactics and Their Influence on Strategy", Naval War College Review, January-February 1986, pp 2-17. (The strategy-tactics interface. The "bottom-up" view of strategy-building. See also his Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, cited in Section II above; and Hill, RADM C. A. "Mark", Jr., USN (Ret.), "Congress and the Carriers", Wings of Gold Spring 1987, pp 6-8. But cf "In My View...: Tactical Skills", Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, p 91: "The best plans are not those developed through top-down or bottom-up approaches. Strategists and tacticians need to keep in mind that the road to sound planning is a two-way, not one-way thoroughfare").

Jampoler, CAPT Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces? ... to Support the Land Battle", Naval War College Review, November-December 1984. (By a member of the 1983-84 Strategic Studies Group at Newport. Argument is distilled from a "scenario" approach. See also fictional treatments by Clancy, Hackett and McGeoch et al., and Hayes et al, cited in Sections I and II, above.).

McGruther, CDR Kenneth R., "Strategy: Ours vs Theirs". Proceedings, February 1984, pp 344-39. (By a former member of the Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). Calls for a strategy based on defeating Soviet strategy, a "threat-based" approach. Unlike Bartlett, however, McGruther's approach is rooted in intentions as well as capabilities. Cf Vlahos chapter, cited in Section I above).

Holloway, ADM James L., III, USN (Ret.), "The U.S. Navy--A Functional Appraisal:, Oceanus, Summer 1985, pp 3-11. (Focus on "mission" by the 1974-78 CNO: "The organization of fleet battle strategy reflects the mission, functions, roles, and deployment of the U.S. Navy"). See also Williams, CDR John A. "Jay", USNR, "U.S. Navy Missions and Force Structure: A Critical Reappraisal", Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1981, pp 499-528; and Byron, CDR John, "Sea Power: The Global Navy", Proceedings, January 1984, pp 30-33. (Alternative views of the Navy's "missions" by two officers who later contributed to the Maritime Strategy's development. Also see "Commentary", Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1982, pp 682-684 for official Navy response to Williams on the eve of Maritime Strategy development, and Williams's rejoinder. Williams's updated views are in "The U.S and Soviet Navies: Missions and Forces", Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1984, pp 507-528).

Moodie, Michael, and Cottrell, Alvin J., Geopolitics and Maritime Power, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981. (A good example of a "hedging" focus. Regards Lehman's "major change" as not enough. Also wants greater naval activity in the Caribbean, periodic visits to the South Atlantic, an enhanced fleet in the Western Pacific, and continuing large-scale activity in the Indian Ocean. See also Sea Plan 2000, cited in Section X above).

** Froggett, CDR S.J., "The Maritime Strategy: Tomahawk's Role", Proceedings, February 1987, PP 51-54; Williams, RADM J.W., Jr., "In My view ... Cross Training", Naval War College Review, March-April 1985, pp 96-97; and Chipman, Dr. Donald D., and Lay, MAJ David, USAF, "Sea Power and the B-52 Stratofortress", Air University Review, January-February 1986, pp 45-50. (Good examples of the "technology" approach to strategy. Focus is on one system--in these cases the cruise missile, the nuclear submarine, and the land-based heavy bomber-- and arguments on strategy are built around it. But cf Taylor, Philip A., "Technologies and Strategies: Trends in Naval Strategies and Tactics", Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 44-55. ("The consensus among senior military officers is that ... technology ... has not, nor is it likely to determine military strategy").

** Ullman, CDR Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "Gramm-Rudman: A Fiscal Pearl Harbour", Naval Forces, II/1986, pp 10-11. (Congressional budget actions seen as potentially disastrous for both the 600-ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy. Exhibits all the pitfalls of a solely "fiscal" approach). See also Ullman, Harlan, U.S. Conventional Force Structure at a Crossroads, Washington: Georgetown University CSIS, 1985; and the annual volumes issued by the Brookings Institution and the Committee for National Security, cited in Sections I-III above.

Neustadt, Richard E. and May, Ernest R., Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers, New York: The Free Press, 1986. (Seeks to focus decision-makers/users of the "historical" approach. Has direct relevance for strategists, a sub-category of "decision- makers". For example, the "cases" highlighted in Section VIII of this addendum and in its predecessor -- The Crimea, Salonika, the Russian Intervention, World War II, etc. --can all be profitably examined using the Neustadt-May methodology).

XII. MAKERS OF MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS

The Maritime Strategy was originally drafted primarily--although certainly not exclusively--by U.S. naval officers for U.S. naval officers. Not only were agreed national, joint, and allied intelligence estimates and concepts of operations utilized as fundamental "building blocks", but great importance was also attached to long-held views of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps leadership, to the concepts of operations of the fleet commanders-in-chief, and to the views of thinkers in uniform (active duty and reserve) at the Naval War College and the Center for Naval Analyses.

Much of what is in the Maritime Strategy is hardly new, and would be especially recognizable to naval officers who developed U.S. and allied naval warfighting concepts in the late 1940s and 1950s. Likewise, elements from key strategy products of naval officers and civilian thinkers of the late 1970s--e.g. the 1976 National Security Council Maritime Strategy study, naval reservist John Lehman's 1978 Aircraft Carriers, and the Navy's 1978 Sea Plan 2000 and Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (NWP 1 (Rev.A))--are also evident in the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s.

Much of what is new in the Maritime Strategy is the linked, coherent discussion of (a) global warfare--rather than separate service and theater operations; (b) warfare tasks--e.g. anti-submarine, anti-air, anti-surface, strike, amphibious, mine and special warfare--rather than traditional "platforms" or "unions"; (c) the specific geopolitical problems facing the U.S. Navy-- and other maritime elements--of the 1980s; and (d) the current conventional wisdom regarding Soviet Navy capabilities and intentions. This approach was largely driven by the primacy of the need for the Strategy to satisfy current global operational requirements of fleet and other force commanders, over the future requirements of competing bureaucracies in Washington. Its effect in fostering common reference points for all portions of the contemporary officer corps, especially junior officers, is already being felt.

While much of the robustness of the Maritime Strategy derives from its roots throughout the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and elsewhere, both over space and over time, it owes a high degree of its current utility to its initial approval and promulgation by successive Chiefs of Naval Operations in Washington and to its codification by their staffs (OPNAV). These include especially the successive Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06), Directors of the Strategy, Plans and Policy Division (OP-60), Heads of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), and staff officers in that branch. OPNAV is the one organization tasked to focus on maritime strategy, and to view it not only in a balanced global manner but also within the bounds of actual current national military planning parameters.

OPNAV's capabilities in this endeavor are due in part to the existence of the Navy Politico-Military/Strategic Planning subspecialty education, screening, and utilization system. This personnel system, while somewhat imperfect, has been identifying, training, and using naval officers in a network of strategists--in Washington, Newport, the Fleet, and elsewhere--for over a decade and a half.

Nevertheless, despite the clear postwar historical roots of the Maritime Strategy and its codification in and dissemination from Washington by some of the best minds in the national security affairs community today, a number of publications appeared in the last decade decrying a lack of strategic training and thinking in the Navy, past and present, and ignoring or misunderstanding the critical role in strategy development of naval officers in staff positions. This literature, as well as some counters to it, is briefly outlined below.

A. The Public Debate: Criticisms and Kudos

Brooks, Captain Linton F., "An Examination of Professional Concerns of Naval Officers as Reflected in their Professional Journal", Naval War College Review, Jan-Feb 1980, pp 46-56. (A future primary contributor to the development and articulation of the Maritime Strategy decries the paucity of articles on strategy in the Navy professional literature of the late 1960s. This era was admittedly dominated by Vietnam and an internal professional view of the navy as primarily an infinitely flexible limited war fire brigade, but it did, however, also see the publication of RADM J. C. Wylie's Military Strategy, RADM Henry Eccles's Military Concepts and Philosophy, and ADM Joseph J. Clark's coauthored Sea Power and its Meaning).

Buell, CDR Thomas B., USN (Ret.), "The Education of a Warrior", Proceedings, January 1981, pp 40-45. Also "Comment and Discussion": February 1981, p 21; March 1981, p 15; April 1981, pp 21-23; June 1981, pp 77-79; July 1981, pp 78-80; August 1981, pp 71-75; November 1981, pp 84-87; January 1982, p 76; March 1982, p 27; April 1982, p 20. (Posed the question: "Where will we get our future strategists?" Implied that the Navy had no real answer to the question, a view shared by most of the eight "commenters and discussants" chosen for publication by the Proceedings, only one of whom was familiar with actual Navy practice in this area. Illustrative of the limited public visibility of true U.S. Navy strategic thought before 1981-82).

Woolsey, R. James, "Mapping 'U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980's'", International Security, Fall 1981, pp 202-207. (By the 1977-1980 Under Secretary of the Navy. "The other side of the coin". A call to bring the "American academic intellectual establishment" and the military establishment more in touch with each other by focusing the efforts of the former on the actual "defense policy" problems of the latter, vice exclusively on "(a) the politico-military situation in the four corners of the globe and (b) nuclear and arms control theology"). For similar disconnects that have occurred even within the field of "nuclear theology" itself, see Rosenberg, David, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy: Theory vs. Practice", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1987, pp 20+. ("Theorists and consultants have had little impact on the development of nuclear weapons policies. Rather, stategic planning should be seen as a governmental process, carried out largely by military officers and civilian bureaucrats").

Bruins, Berend D., "Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?", Proceedings, January 1982, pp 52-56. Also "Comment and Discussion": March 1982, p 27; April 1982, p 20; May 1982, p 17. (The Proceedings throws three more retirees and an active-duty non-strategist into the public fray. Meanwhile, fleet plans staffs, the Strategic Studies Group at Newport, and the one intelligence officer and nine line officers--six with PhDs--assigned to OP-603 were at the time actively laying the groundwork for the Maritime Strategy. Illustrative of the limited public visibility of actual naval strategic thinkers before 1982-83.).

Hanks, RADM Robert J., USN (Ret.), "Whither U.S. Naval Strategy?", Strategic Review, Summer 1982, pp 16-22. (An outstanding OP-60 of the 1970s challenges the U.S. Navy to develop a coherent strategy, an activity being vigorously pursued even as the article was published).

Leh[illegible], John F., Jr., "Thinking About Strategy," Shipmate, April 1982, pp. 18-20. (SECNAV's charge to the officer corps.)

Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "Naval Strategy for the Next Century: Resurgence of the Naval War College as the Center of Strategic Naval Thought", National Defense, April 1983, pp 27-30. (Covers the resurgence of the Naval War College, although without describing the linkages between that institution and the strategic planners in Washington, through which Naval War College thinking is actually translated into Maritime Strategy elements). Also see 1983 Murray article cited in Section I above.

Milsted, LCDR Charles E., Jr., "A Corps of Naval Strategists", Masters Degree Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1983. Based on the somewhat skewed open literature available during this period. As with Bruins, above, "strategy" and "long-range planning" not well differentiated. Proposed establishment of a network of specifically educated and trained naval strategists responsible for long-range planning. Following his own model, Milsted was subsequently assigned to OP-603 from 1983 to 1985, where he became a key contributor to the codification of the Maritime Strategy. Cf U.S. Navy, First Annual Long Range Planners' Conference cited in Section I above).

Hattendorf, John, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U. S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: Naval War Colege Press, 1984. (Chronicles the important supporting role of the Naval War College in the development and dissemination of U. S. Navy strategic thought. See especially pp. 201-202, 237, 312-319.)

Crackel, LTCOL Theodore J., USA (Ret.), "On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels", Public Interest, Summer 1984, pp 18-30. ("The services have produced no strategic thinkers at all." He is especially hard on War College faculties, including the Naval War College: "None of the war college faculties is in the forefront of development in any of the military disciplines they teach." Actually, no group has been more in the "forefront of development" in the "discipline" of Maritime Strategy (SECNAV, the CNO, the OP-06 organization, and the Strategic Studies Group aside) than the Naval War College faculty, as is evidenced by their prominence in this bibliography. Crackel is a military historian by training with little apparent experience in actual strategy- or policy-making, and with an almost exclusively U.S. Army-oriented academic and operational record. Unlike most practicing U.S. naval strategists, he has apparently self-fulfilled his prophecy and "discovered that the think-tanks in and around Washington are a more congenial environment").

"413 Named as Proven Subspecialists", Navy Times, September 9, 1985, p 58. (The Navy system for identifying the "pool" of naval strategists. Results of the seventh biennial U.S. Navy selection board that identifies "proven" subspecialists for further mid- and high-level assignments in the eight fields of naval Political-Military/Strategic Planning. Earlier lists appeared in Navy Times back into the 1970s. Includes many of the builders of the Maritime Strategy. Note that these names constitute not only the "Corps of Naval Strategists", but also the Navy's Politico-Military and Regional Affairs experts).

** Stavridis, LCDR Jim, "An Ocean Away: Outreach from the Naval War College", Shipmate, November 1985, p 8. (On the role of the Naval War College in contributing to OP-603's codification of the Maritime Strategy, and in "getting the word out" to mid-grade naval officers. By a former OP-603 member).

* Marryott, RADM Ronald F., "President's Notes", Naval War College Review, Nov-Dec 1985, pp 2-4. (By the 1985-86 President of the Naval War College and 1983-84 Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60), the Navy's principal global strategist. On development of the Maritime Strategy, and the Naval War College's vital supporting contribution).

** CNA Annual Report: 1985, Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1986, especially pp 7-12 and 29-30. (On CNA's contribution to the development of the Maritime Strategy and on its use of that strategy in planning its research programs. Also, CNA analysts' views on Soviet maritime strategy).

Davis, CAPT Vincent, USNR (Ret.), "Decision Making, Decision Makers, and Some of the Results", in Cimbala, Stephen, (ed.), The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment, Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 1986, pp 23-62. (A somewhat anachronistic characterization of the contemporary Navy as one with "too few thinkers", riven by acrimonious debates among factions of naval officers. "Rancorous disputes simmer among its 'big three unions'--the carrier, submarine, and surface-warfare admirals". Thus the seminal thinker and writer on naval strategy and bureaucratic politics of the 40s, 50s, and 60s sees no essential change in the Navy of the mid-80s, -- despite conscious Navy efforts to take his earlier counsel to heart in its development of a transcendent Maritime Strategy. Cf articles by VADMs Demars, Schoultz, and Dunn--leaders of the submarine and air warfare communities--and by LTs Winnefeld, Peppe and Keller--the rising generation--cited in Sections II and III above).

** Bush, Ted, "Libyan Exercise Exemplifies New Navy Strategy", Navy Times, February 10, 1986, pp 45-46. (OPNAV strategists illuminate a variety of aspects of the Maritime Strategy and its origins. Note that, unlike open-literature authors, actual practicing strategists usually remain nameless to the general public. This hardly means, however, that they are somehow less important).

** Leibstone, Marvin, "US Report", Naval Forces, II/1986, p 94. Alleges "an unusually large number of naval officers do not recognize fully the switch from 'defense' to 'offense' that the Navy's high command believes is necessary". But cf "The United States Navy: On the Crest of the Wave", The Economist, April 19, 1986, p 49 cited above: "What is certain is that an entire generation of junior and middle-grade naval officers now believes that the first wartime job of the navy would be to sail north and fight the Russians close to their bases".

** Burdick, CAPT Howard, "Sons of the Prophet: A View of the Naval War College Faculty", Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, pp 81-89. (On the Naval War College, its faculty, and the Maritime Strategy, by the Dean of Academics at the Naval War College).

** Wirt, Robert T., "Strategic ASW", Submarine Review, July 1986, pp 50-56. (Calls for a comprehensive ASW plan, driven by submariners, to support the Maritime Strategy. Unionism is not quite dead yet).

** Metcalf, VADM Joseph, "Metcalf Speaks Out: On the Navy's New Offense, Ship Design and Archimedes", Navy News and Undersea Technology, July 18, 1986, p 2. (The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare views Maritime Strategy as of little concern to Navy junior officers. Not a common view).

** Gallotta, CAPT Richard USN (Ret) et al, Assessment of Maritime Strategy Education and Training in the Department of the Navy. McLean VA: The BDM Corporation, December 31, 1986. (A comprehensive balanced survey, with recommendations).

Murray, Williamson, "Grading the War Colleges", National Interest, Winter 1986/7, pp 12-19. (Antidote to Crackel. "The best of the war colleges, the Naval War College at Newport, sets the standard by which the other war colleges should be measured." "The strategy and policy curriculum has justifiably acquired a reputation as the premier course in the United States, if not the Western world, for the examination of strategy. So high is the Naval War College's reputation, that over the course of the past few years it has attracted a number of the best young military historians and political scientists in national security affairs to Newport.").

** Clark, Charles S., "In Person: Fred H. Rainbow: Charting a Course for the Navy's Debates", National Journal, February 21, 1987, p 435. (On the role of the Proceedings in orchestrating "some heated forensics over the Navy's trumpeted Maritime Strategy (while) similar Air Force and Army journals often reflect the blandness of official restraints". The Institute has come a long way in just a few short years. Like the Naval War College and the Naval War College Review, the Naval Institute and the Proceedings are clearly at the cutting edge of maritime strategy debate today).

** Tritten, CDR James, "New Directions," Naval War College Review, Spring 1987, p. 94. (By the Chairman of the Naval Postgraduate School National Security Affairs Department and a former OP-60 staffer. On the revitalization of naval history and strategy studies at the "PG School").

** Hearding, LCDR David, "A Requiem for the Silent Service", Submarine Review, July 1987, pp 73-78. (An important article, stressing the need for broader integration of U.S. Navy submarine officers into the Navy as a whole, in part as a result of the advent of the Maritime Strategy).

B. The Public Record: OP-603

From 1982 to the present, the primary U.S. Navy organization charged with codifying, refining, and articulating the consensus in the Navy regarding the Maritime Strategy has been the OPNAV Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). Organized by VADM William J. Crowe (then OP-06) and RADM Robert Hilton (then OP-60) in 1978, OP-603 evolved into an office of about a dozen post-graduate educated, trained, professional operator - strategists, including U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Central Intelligence Agency officers.

Almost invisible to the general and national security affairs academic publics--especially when contrasted to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, OP-06 and OP-60, the operational commanders, the Strategic Studies Group and the Naval War College--these officers have nevertheless been those principally responsible for the development of the Maritime Strategy as a unified, coherent, global framework and common U.S. and allied naval vision.

As with war planners, but unlike war college faculties, their output is largely classified. Nevertheless, they--and their superiors, OP-60 and OP-60B-- have often also achieved respectable open publication records. Typically, their writings prior to assignment to OP-60/603 reflect their diverse operational and academic interests and achievements; their publications during and after their assignment as strategists usually reflect their work on the Maritime Strategy. (For the latter, see the entries cited earlier in this bibliography by RADMs Hanks, Marryott, and Pendley; CAPTs Barnett, Brooks, Johnson, McGruther, and Swartz; CDRs Hickman, Kalb, and Milsted; and LCDRs Pocalyko and Stavridis. For the former, see the entries below. They represent, admittedly, only a portion of the record, limited only to the products of those officers who were specifically and principally assigned to codify the Maritime Strategy, generally the OP-603 "Branch Heads" and "Maritime Strategy Action Officers" serving from 1982 through 1986. They are provided only to illustrate the breadth of experience and depth of thought members of the U.S. Navy's current, functioning "Corps of Naval Strategists" bring with them when they report for duty).

Weeks, LCDR Stanley B., "United States Defense Policy Toward Spain, 1950-1976, unpublished PhD dissertation, American University, 1977; and Johnson, LCDR William S., "Naval Diplomacy and the Failure of Balanced Security in the Far East -- 1921-1935, and "Defense Budget Constraints and the Fate of the Carrier in the Royal Navy", Navy War College Review, February 1972, pp 67-88 and May-June 1973, pp 12-30. (Operators and international relations specialists as future strategists. By the OP-60 co-drafters of the initial 1982-1983 U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy briefings and testimony).

Barnett, CAPT Roger W., "Soviet Strategic Reserves and the Soviet Navy", in Currie, MAJ Kenneth M. and Varhall, MAJ Gregory, The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead? Military Political Affairs in the 1980s, Washington: USGPO, 1985, pp 581-605. (The operator and Sovietologist as future strategist. A 1980 paper by the 1983-84 OP-603 Branch Head). See also his "Their Professional Journal" (with Dr. Edward J. Lacey), Proceedings, October 1982, pp 95-101.

Seaquist, CDR Larry, "Memorandum for the Commander. Subject: Tactical Proficiency", and "Tactics to Improve Tactical Proficiency", Proceedings, July 1981, pp 58-61 and February 1983, pp 37-42. (The operator and tactician as future strategist. By a member of the 1983-84 Strategic Studies Group and 1984-85 OP-603 Branch Head).

Parker, LCDR T. Wood, "Thinking Offensively", Proceedings, April 1981, pp 26-31; "Theater Nuclear Warfare and the U.S. Navy", Naval War College Review, Jan-Feb 1982, pp 3-16; and "Paradigms, Conventional Wisdom, and Naval Warfare", Proceedings, April 1983, pp 29-35. (The operator and War College student as future strategist. Three prize-winning essays by the 1984-85 principal OP-603 Maritime Strategy Action Officer).

Daly, CAPT Thomas M. and Myers, CDR Albert C., "The Art of ASW", Proceedings, October 1985, pp 164-165. (Operators and warfare specialists as strategists. The 1985-86 OP-603 Branch Head and his primary Maritime Strategy Action Officer discuss their primary warfare specialty. See also Daly Proceedings articles on the Iran-Iraq War, July 1984 and May and July 1985, and on the Bikini A-Bomb tests, July 1986).).

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